Ace Utilities 6.5.0 Build 298 Key + Keygen Key Free Download 2021

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ACDSEE PRO 4.0.198 FULL - KEYGEN - [FREE DOWNLOAD] 2/11 A2 A2 01NC01NC VEM4 KM1 KM2 1S B C 10 00 01 V 00 14 1S B C 10 00 07 V 00 14 1S B C 10 00 06 V 00 14 1S B C 10 00 02 V 00 14 1S B C 10 00 14 V 00 14 1S B C 10 00 16 V 00 14 AF09 AF96 3-pole contactors Main accessories Ordering details (1) For contactors Auxiliary contacts Order code Pkg qty Weight (1 pce) kg Front-mounted instantaneous auxiliary contact blocks AF09 AF96 1 0 – – CA 1 0 Ace Utilities 6.5.0 Build 298 Key + Keygen Key Free Download 2021 – – CA 1 AF09 AF 2 2 – – CAM 1 AF26 AF 2 2 – – CAE 1 AF09 AF 2 2 – – CAU 1 Front-mounted auxiliary contact blocks with N.O. leading contact and N.C. lagging contact AF09 AF96 – – 1 0 CC 1 – – 0 1 CC 1 Side-mounted instantaneous auxiliary contact blocks AF09 AF96 1 1 – Cubase 9.5.41 Element Full Crack Free Download Is Here CAL 1 Front-mounted instantaneous auxiliary contact and A1/A2 coil terminal blocks AF09 AF 1 1 – – CATM 1 AF26 AF 1 1 – – CATE 1 AF09 AF 1 1 – – CATU 1 Note: CAT4 not suitable for AF.Z contactors with DC control voltage V DC. Mechanical interlock unit AF09 AF30 VM4 10 AF40 AF96 VM 10 Note: VM4 and VM include 2 fixing clips (BB4) to maintain together both contactors. Mechanical and electrical interlock set AF09 AF16 AF26 AF38 0 2 – – VEM4 1 Note: - VEM4 includes Ace Utilities 6.5.0 Build 298 Key + Keygen Key Free Download 2021 VM4 mechanical interlock unit with 2 fixing clips (BB4), a VE4 electrical interlock block. VE4 block must be used with A2-A2 connection to respect the electrical connection diagram. - VEM4 not suitable for AF.Z contactors with DC control voltage V DC. For contactors Time delay range selected by switch Delay type Auxiliary contacts Order code Pkg qty Weight (1 pce) kg Electronic timers AF09 AF96  s  s  s ON-delay 1 1 TEF4-ON 1 OFF-delay 1 1 TEF4-OFF 1 Note: Rated control circuit voltage Uc V 50/60 Hz or DC. Connecting links with manual motor starters AF09 AF16 with MS … MS, BEA 10 MS … MS AF26 AF30 with MS … MS, BEA 10 MS MS with MS … MS, BEA 10 MS MS Connection sets for reversing contactors AF09 AF16 BER 1 AF26 AF30 BER 1 AF40 AF65 BER 1 AF80 AF96 BER 1 Connection sets for star-delta starting AF09 AF16 With or without VM4 BEY 1 AF26 AF30 With or without VM4 BEY 1 AF40 AF65 With or without VM BEY 1 AF80 AF96 With or without VM BEY 1 (1) For more information, refer to "Accessories" section. CA CAE BEA BER VEM4 CATE CAL 1S B C 10 00 04 V 00 14 TEF4-ON 1S B C 10 00 11 V 00 14 _ABB_maincatalogue_healthplum.us 11 2 ABB Tmax power distribution circuit breakers15 1 ABB Dealer healthplum.usVI MERCANTILE PVT. LTD. Tel: - 40 Email: [email&#;protected] healthplum.us Cell: + In (A) Poles 3 4 In (A) Poles 10 3 25 63 10 4 25 63 Tmax power distribution circuit breakers T3N F F Icu = 36KA, Ics = 75%(Icu)TMD PR DS-LS/I T3S F F Icu = 50KA, Ics = 50%(Icu) T2 Ordering Code L.P.(`) 1SDAR1  17, 1SDAR1  19, 1SDAR1  22, 1SDAR1  25, Ordering Code L.P.(`) 1SDAR1 16, 1SDAR1 1SDAR1  1SDAR1  1SDAR1  20, 1SDAR1 21, 1SDAR1 1SDAR1 1SDAR1 1SDAR1 28, Ordering Code L.P.(`) 1SDAR1 20, 1SDAR1 1SDAR1  1SDAR1  1SDAR1  26, 1SDAR1 25, 1SDAR1 1SDAR1 1SDAR1 1SDAR1 35, Ordering Code L.P.(`) 1SDAR1 22, 1SDAR1 1SDAR1 1SDAR1 1SDAR1 30, 1SDAR1 28, 1SDAR1 1SDAR1 1SDAR1 1SDAR1 38, T3 Icu Ics(Icu) N 36KA 75% S 50KA 50% Breaking Capacity at VAC T2N F F Icu = 36KA, Ics = %(Icu) T2S F F Icu = 50KA, Ics = %(Icu) T2H F F Icu = 70KA, Ics = %(Icu)  Stock items Ordering Code L.P.(`) 1SDAR1  20, 1SDAR1  23, 1SDAR1  25, 1SDAR1  27, 16 Tmax power distribution circuit breakers 你在想屁吃?189321‑11‑20ClaudiaHeart/scoop-bucket-claudiaheart: my scoop bucket50021‑11‑03Clownfused/bucket-o-clowns: A bucket for healthplum.us apps10019‑03‑03CodeIdeal/scoop-bucket: My Package Manager Tool Tally.ERP 9 6.6.3 Crack + License Key Free Download 2021 Package List30020‑11‑24Cologler/cologler-scoop-bucket: a bucket that contains tools created by me40121‑11‑15CometDog/scoop-bucket: A repo for my scoop bucket50018‑05‑31CypherNL/My-Bucket: Scoop bucket to test upcoming app manifests20020‑10‑02DEEP-IMPACT-AG/scoop-hyperdrive: Scoop bucket for the hyperdrive10021‑01‑22DStalkerBR/stalkerbucket: My custom bucket for scoop package manager41020‑09‑23DamianReeves/scoop-tools: A scoop bucket for tools10018‑06‑09DanteTheEgregore/smithy: A Scoop Bucket10018‑09‑06Darkatse/Scoop-Darkatse: Personal bucket with wide variety of applications of all kind.206121‑11‑19Darkatse/Scoop-KanColle: A scoop bucket for KanColle players135021‑11‑02DavidBrockmeier/bucket: scoop bucket121021‑10‑25DeezCashews/tilt-bucket: Bucket for scoop installs10018‑05‑17Deide/deide-bucket: Personal bucket for healthplum.us613021‑11‑12DessertArbiter/dessertarbiter-shovel: My new personal bucket for Scoop31021‑11‑18DiXN/scoop80121‑11‑20DimiG/dgBucket: Scoop personal bucket111021‑06‑24DinVolodka/my-bucket: bucket for scoop (extra apps for scoop)10016‑09‑22DopplerHQ/scoop-doppler: Package Manager Doppler CLI for Windows12121‑11‑18Doublemine/scoops: a buckets to collection some application for scoop11017‑12‑25Dragon/Scoop-Bucket: Personal Scoop Bucket (Rarely used apps only)42021‑11‑19DragonightFury/DragonightFuryScoopBucket: healthplum.us bucket with my personal apps70021‑11‑16Duckle29/duckles_bucket: My scoop bucket for scoop things20021‑11‑20EgonKlax/scoop-egonklax: Scoop repository10021‑11‑01ErnWong/scoop-bucket: My Laplink PCMover Pro Crack manifests bucket of scoop goodness30018‑03‑13FDUZS/spoon: A Scoop bucket for personal use.104021‑11‑19Faustvii/scoop-bucket: Scoop bucket for some of my custom tools or apps I need23021‑04‑12Fireforge/my-bucket: My custom healthplum.us bucket10020‑08‑03Freshly/scoops: A bucket of manifests for the Windows package manager Scoop10021‑09‑17GGP1/scoop-bucket10021‑10‑16GNQG/scoop-bucket: A scoop bucket for some tools10021‑10‑19GianPDev/scoop-bucket10021‑10‑05GotAnAccount/scoopBucket: scoop bucket iwth additional apps30021‑02‑16GreatGodApollo/trough: The Brett Bender Scoop bucket42021‑04‑26Greydus/weeb-bucket: A scoop bucket containing various utilities that I use31018‑07‑30GunMoe/scoop-bucket: a private scoop bucket140021‑05‑29HCLonely/scoop-bucket: 自用scoop bucket.310021‑11‑18HUMORCE/nuke: A scoop bucket for use.920021‑11‑20HYY-yu/scoop-bucket10021‑03‑10Harakku/harakkus-scoop-bucket: Bucket for scoop manifests.230021‑04‑18Hayxi/Soap: Personal bucket for healthplum.us50021‑11‑08Hsins/yogurt: 🍨 A sweet Scoop bucket.31020‑12‑11HueLiu/scoop-muggle: A bucket with lots of cool and unique applications60021‑11‑19Huis/my-scoop-bucket20020‑05‑27Inari-Whitebear/scoopBucket30020‑01‑07JKorbelRA/scoop-for-lazy-admins: Scoop bucket for lazy admins.10021‑07‑09JTBrinkmann/scoop-bucket: my personal scoop bucket for tools that I’m missing in the main bucket, see healthplum.us90021‑08‑27Jackymancs4/scoop-bucket20020‑12‑23JaimeZeng/self-bucket: A Scoop bucket.500021‑11‑19JanydChang/bucket: A bucket of Scoop50020‑05‑06JaxRaffnix/scoop-my-bucket20021‑11‑18JayTwoLab/j2doll-scoop-bucket: :cd: scoop bucket for personal purpose :kr: 개인용 스쿱 버킷20021‑09‑24JeWeizhong/mybucket: scoop bucket for myself20021‑03‑20Jeddunk/scoop-bucket: scoop bucket for misc software30021‑07‑12Jokler/scoop-bucket: My bucket for programs not in the official buckets60118‑07‑17JorundMartinsen/scoop-buckets: contains a bucket for apps I use80020‑12‑26Jvcon/werkzeuge: A personal scoop buckets310021‑06‑01K-JW/scoop-science-tools: A Scoop bucket for science tools.20020‑03‑31KNOXDEV/wsl: A scoop bucket for Window Subsystem for Linux distros. No Windows Store necessary. mirror of: healthplum.us1130421‑11‑18Kantouzin/scoop-bucketouzin: (Scoop) bucket + Kantouzin = bucketouzin30019‑12‑29Kazanami/zeus-bucket: My Original Bucket61121‑09‑04KeySpot/scoop-bucket: Scoop Bucket for KeySpot applications10021‑09‑18Kiskadee-dev/bucket: Scoop bucket10020‑06‑06KnotUntied/scoop-fonts: Scoop bucket for installing fonts0021‑11‑17KnotUntied/scoop-knotuntied: Personal Scoop bucket930121‑11‑20Kore-Development/scoop-bucket: A Scoop bucket11019‑02‑27Krzysztof-Cieslak/scoop-fsharp-extras: Scoop bucket with F# specific utilities10017‑06‑04L-Trump/scoop-raresoft: 提供许多破解版的应用87601021‑11‑07LKI/scoop-bucket: A scoop bucket.10020‑05‑21LasseJensen/ScoopTest90021‑02‑05LeagueJinx/moli-scoop-bucket40021‑01‑11LengSword/scoop-yls: Personal bucket130021‑11‑19LindenXing/my-bucket: scoop bucket30019‑07‑29Liszt21/Dragon: Personal bucket of scoop140020‑12‑10LockTech/scoop-locktech: Installation data for LockTech’s projects, to be used with the Scoop CLI installer.10021‑10‑15Lomeli12/ScoopBucket: A bucket to install my programs using Scoop (healthplum.us)80021‑11‑17LumaKernel/my-scoop-buckets: [SCRATCH]40120‑04‑14LuoHuiRu/ScoopBucket210021‑11‑17MCOfficer/scoop-bucket: My personal scoop bucket.555121‑11‑19MCOfficer/scoop-nirsoft: My own shot at a healthplum.us-bucket. Contains all + programs.42621‑09‑27MarkMichaelis/ScoopBucket251121‑11‑18MarksonHon/repo: A Scoop bucket81121‑08‑20Master-Hash/bucket: My scoop repo (for learning only)50021‑05‑15MattKang/scoop-bucket: Bucket for healthplum.us20017‑04‑20Milo/cone: Personal Scoop bucket252021‑11‑20Moeologist/scoop-completion: scoop tab completion, work with powershell168721‑11‑04MoltenCoreDev/wucket-o-bater: wucket o’ bater is a scoop bucket i guess10021‑11‑14MrMikeandike/MAIScoopBucket: Personal scoop bucket.30020‑10‑20Mushus/scoop-bucket: scoop bucket vstプラグインだけで分けたほうが良さそうなのでリポジトリ移動するかも。131119‑04‑02NSIS-Dev/scoop-nsis: NSIS bucket for scoop, a command-line installer for Windows673221‑09‑30Naboris/nab-scoop: my scoop bucket with random tools20021‑10‑02Nalad/my-bucket: mine scoop bucket10021‑09‑25Nirose/node: Personal scoop bucket70021‑11‑19NyaMisty/scoop_bucket_misty52021‑11‑20OpenIoTHub/scoop-bucket70021‑09‑27OpenJNY/my-scoop-bucket: This is a repository for my own scoop bucket.80021‑11‑10OrigamiKing/xxx: scoop bucket10019‑11‑20Paxxs/Cluttered-bucket: 🍺 Scoop bucket Tmax motor protection circuit breakers 25 1 ABB Dealer healthplum.usVI MERCANTILE PVT. LTD. Tel: - 40 Email: [email&#;protected] healthplum.us Cell: + T6D - Fixed (F), Icw (1s) = 15 kA T7D- Fixed (F), Icw (1s) = 20 kA T7D M - Fixed (F), Icw (1s) = 20 kA T4D- Fixed (F), Icw (1s) = 3,6 kA T5D- Fixed (F)Icw (1s) = 3,6 kA T1D - Fixed (F), Icw (1s) = 2,2 kA T3D - Fixed (F), Icw (1s) = kA Tmax switch disconnectors T1D F FC Cu T3D F F T4D F F T5D F F T5D F F T6D F F T7D F F T7D M F F T4D F F T6D F F T7D F F T7D M F F T6D E F T7D F F T7D M F F Poles 3 4 Poles 3 4 Poles 3 4 Poles 3 4 Poles 3 4 In(A) Ordering Code L.P.(`) 1SDAR1 23, 1SDAR1 30, In(A) Ordering Code L.P.(`) 1SDAR1 31, 1SDAR1 39, In(A) Ordering Code L.P.(`) 1SDAR1 38, 1SDAR1 63, In(A) Ordering Code L.P.(`) 1SDAR1 1,04, 1SDAR1 1,29, In(A) Ordering Code L.P.(`) 1SDAR1 1,09, 1SDAR1 1,34, In(A) Ordering Code L.P.(`) 1SDAR1 67, 1SDAR1 84, In(A) Ordering Code L.P.(`) 1SDAR1 1,09, 1SDAR1 1,34, In(A) Ordering Code L.P.(`) 1SDAR1 1,20, 1SDAR1 1,50, Poles 3 4 In(A) Ordering Code L.P.(`) 1SDAR1 8, 1SDAR1 12, In(A) Ordering Code L.P.(`) 1SDAR1 18, 1SDAR1 21, In(A) Ordering Code L.P.(`) 1SDAR1 20, 1SDAR1 27, In(A) Ordering Code L.P.(`) 1SDAR1 25, 1SDAR1 32, In(A) Ordering Code L.P.(`) 1SDAR1 35, 1SDAR1 42, In(A) Ordering Code L.P.(`) 1SDAR1 77, 1SDAR1 98, In(A) Ordering Code L.P.(`) 1SDAR1 95, 1SDAR1 1,20, 26 Tmax switch disconnectors Protection and connection ABB Dealer healthplum.usVI MERCANTILE PVT. LTD. Tel: - 40 Email: [email&#;protected] healthplum.us Cell: + OT switch disconnectors OT A switch disconnector supplied with extended shaft and IP 65 pistol type handle Front operated switch-disconnectors Rated current In [A] Poles Description Ordering code L.P. SANGHAVI MERCANTILE PVT. LTD. Tel: - 40 Email: [email&#;protected] healthplum.us Cell: + Frame Description Ordering code L.P. (`) OT F3 OTS40T3 1SCAR OTF3 OTS63T3 1SCAR OT F3 OTST3 1SCAR Terminal shrouds snap-on mounting, transparent For 3-pole switches OTST1 OTS_L_ Terminal shrouds The type and the ordering numbers are for one piece. Suitable for Type Order number Delivery Weight/ switches batch unit [pcs] [kg] Snap-on mounting, transparent For 3-pole switches OT F3, -FT3 OTS40T3 1SCAR 10 OTF3, -FT3 OTS63T3 1SCAR 10 OT F3, FT3 OTST3 1SCAR 10 OTFL_ OTST3L 1SCAR 1 OTE3 OTST3 1SCAR 1 OTF3 with terminal clamps OZXL1 or OZXT1 OTST3P 1SCAR 10 For 4-pole switches OTE4 OTST4 1SCAR 1 For 1 to 4-pole switches, shroud for single pole and for fourth pole OTP_40F_ OTS40T1 1SCAR 10 OTP_80F_ OTS63T1 1SCAR 10 OTP_F_ OTST1 1SCAR 10 OTE_ OTST1 1SCAR 1 For OTE3 with terminal clamps OZXL1/1 or OZXT1 OTST1P 1SCAR 10 Snap-on mounting, grey plastic Pack of single pole shrouds, IP 3X. Transparent shrouds available on request. Suitable for Description Type Order number Units/ Weight/ switches type unit [pcs] [kg] For 3-pole switches OTEV…/OTM Long type OTSG1L/3 1SCAR 3 OTEV…/OTM Short type OTSG1S/3 1SCAR 3 OT/OTM… Long type OTSG1L/3 1SCAR 3 OT/OTM… Short type OTSG1S/3 1SCAR 3 OT/OTM… Long type OTSG1L/3 1SCAR 3 OT/OTM… Short type OTSG1S/3 1SCAR 3 OT/OTM Long type OTSG1L/3 1SCAR 3 OT/OTM Short type OTSG1S/3 1SCAR 3 OT/OTM… Long type OTSG1L/3 1SCAR 3 1 OT/OTM… Short type OTSG1S/3 1SCAR 3 For 4-pole switches OTEV…/ OTM Long type OTSG1L/4 1SCAR 4 OTEV…/ OTM Short type OTSG1S/4 1SCAR 4 OT/OTM… Long type OTSG1L/4 1SCAR 4 OT/OTM… Short type OTSG1S/4 1SCAR 4 OT/OTM… Long type OTSG1L/4 1SCAR 4 OT/OTM… Short type OTSG1S/4 1SCAR 4 OT/OTM Long type OTSG1L/4 1SCAR 4 OT/OTM Short type OTSG1S/4 1SCAR 4 OT/OTM… Long type OTSG1L/4 1SCAR 4 OT/OTM… Short type OTSG1S/4 1SCAR 4 Terminal shrouds for terminal clamps Snap-on mounting, transparent plastic, IP 2X. Suitable for Type Order number Units/ Weight/ terminal clamps type unit [pcs] [kg] OZXB2, 2L OZXB2K 1SCAR 3 OZXB3, 4 OZXB3K 1SCAR 3 OZXB5, 6 OZXB4K 1SCAR 3 OZXB7, 7L OZXB5K 1SCAR 3 OTS_T3 OTS_T1 OTS_S_ OZXB2K OZXB3K OZXB4K OZXB5K Terminal shrouds S 00 26 5A S 00 46 2A S 01 Freemake Audio Converter Infinity Pack For Windows 4A S 01 63 8A S 01 63 7A S 00 21 6A S 00 21 7A S 00 22 0A S 00 22 1A S 00 22 2A S 00 21 5A S 00 21 8A S 00 21 9A S 00 23 3A S 00 22 4A OTST3L S 07 09 0 Switch-disconnectors OT, OETL and OTM Java is a standards-based "Drop-in Compliance" solution for native Java environments. The module features robust algorithm 4k youtube to mp3 error cant initialize - Crack Key For U, including Suite B algorithm compliance. CryptoComply offloads secure key management, data integrity, data at rest encryption, and secure communications to a trusted implementation."
Draeger Medical Systems Inc.
6 Tech Drive
Andover, MA
USA

Michael Robinson
TEL: +1
FAX: +1

CST Lab: NVLAP DRAEGER WCM ABGN VG2
(Hardware Version: MS Rev. 02; Firmware Version: VG2 with Bootloader version )
(When operated in FIPS mode. When initialized and configured as specified in Section of the Security Policy)

Validated to FIPS
Consolidated Validation Certificate

Security Policy
Hardware12/07/12/6/Overall Level: 1

-Mitigation of Other Attacks: N/A
-Tested Configuration(s): N/A

-FIPS Approved algorithms: AES (Certs. # and #); KTS (AES Cert. #; key establishment methodology provides bits of encryption strength); SHS (Cert. #); HMAC (Cert. #); RSA (Cert. #); DRBG (Cert. #); KBKDF (Cert. #45); CVL (Cert. #)

-Other algorithms: NDRNG; Diffie-Hellman (key agreement; key establishment methodology provides bits of encryption strength; non-compliant less than bits of encryption strength); RSA (key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides bits of encryption strength; non-compliant less than bits of encryption strength); RC4; DES; HMAC-MD4; HMAC-MD5
Multi-Chip Embedded

"The DRAEGER WCM ABGN VG2 is a dual band n Wireless Communications Module used in a variety of Draeger products for wireless communications."
SafeNet, Inc.
20 Colonnade Road, Suite
Ottawa, ON K2E 7M6
Canada

Security and Certifications Team

CST Lab: NVLAP Luna® PCI-e Cryptographic Module
(Hardware Versions: VBD, VBD and VBD; Firmware Versions: and )
(This validation entry is a non-security relevant modification to Cert. #)

Validated to FIPS
Consolidated Validation Certificate

Security Policy

Vendor Product Link
Hardware12/02/
01/10/
06/23/
06/23/1/9/Overall Level: 3

-FIPS Approved algorithms: AES (Certs. #, # and #); DRBG (Cert. #); DSA (Certs. #, # and #); ECDSA (Certs. #, # and #); HMAC (Certs. # and #); KAS (Cert. #23); RSA (Certs. # and #); SHS (Certs. # and #); KBKDF (SPvendor affirmed); Triple-DES (Certs. #, # and #); Triple-DES MAC (Triple-DES Certs. #, # and #, vendor-affirmed)

-Other algorithms: ARIA; AES (Certs. #, # and #, key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides between and bits of encryption strength); AES MAC (Cert. #; non-compliant); CAST5; CAST5-MAC; DES; DES MAC; Hma pro vpn activation code 2020 - Free Activators (key agreement; key establishment methodology provides between and bits of encryption strength); HAS; KCDSA; MD2; MD5; RC2; RC2-MAC; RC4; RC5; RC5-MAC; RSA (key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides between and bits of encryption strength; non-compliant less than bits of encryption strength); SEED; Triple-DES (Certs. #, # and #, key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides bits of encryption strength; non-compliant less than bits of encryption strength)
Multi-Chip Embedded

"The Luna PCI-e cryptographic module is a multi-chip embedded hardware cryptographic module in the form of a PCI-Express card that typically resides within a custom computing or secure communications appliance. The cryptographic module is contained in its own secure enclosure that provides physical resistance to tampering. The cryptographic boundary of the module is defined to encompass all components inside the secure enclosure on the PCI-e card."
SafeNet, Inc.
20 Colonnade Road, Suite
Ottawa, ON K2E 7M6
Canada

Security and Certifications Team

CST Lab: NVLAP Luna® PCI-e Cryptographic Module
(Hardware Versions: VBD, VBD and VBD; Firmware Versions: and )
(This validation entry is a non-security relevant modification to Cert. #)

Validated to FIPS
Consolidated Validation Certificate

Security Policy

Vendor Product Link
Hardware12/02/
01/10/
06/23/
06/23/1/9/Overall Level: 2

-Physical Security: Level 3
-EMI/EMC: Level 3
-Design Assurance: Level 3

-FIPS Approved algorithms: AES (Certs. #, # and #); DRBG (Cert. #); DSA (Certs. #, # and #); ECDSA (Certs. #, # and #); HMAC (Certs. # and #); KAS (Cert. #23); RSA (Certs. # and #); SHS (Certs. # and #); KBKDF (SP, vendor affirmed); Triple-DES (Certs. #, # and #); Triple-DES MAC (Triple-DES Certs. #, # and #, vendor-affirmed)

-Other algorithms: ARIA; AES (Certs. #, # and #, key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides between and bits of encryption strength); AES MAC (Cert. #; non-compliant); CAST5; CAST5-MAC; DES; DES MAC; Diffie-Hellman (key agreement; key establishment methodology provides between and bits of encryption strength); HAS; KCDSA; MD2; MD5; RC2; RC2-MAC; RC4; RC5; Ace Utilities 6.5.0 Build 298 Key + Keygen Key Free Download 2021 RSA (key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides between and bits of encryption strength; non-compliant less than bits of encryption strength); SEED; Triple-DES (Certs. #, # and #, key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides bits of encryption strength; non-compliant less than bits of encryption strength)
Multi-Chip Embedded

"The Luna PCI-e cryptographic module is a multi-chip embedded hardware cryptographic module in the form of a PCI-Express card that typically resides within a custom computing or secure communications appliance. The cryptographic module is contained in its own secure enclosure that provides physical resistance to tampering. The cryptographic boundary of the module is defined to encompass all components inside the secure enclosure on the PCI-e card."
Dell EMC
South Street
Hopkinton, MA
USA

Kerry Bellefontaine

CST Lab: NVLAP VMAX 6 Gb/s SAS I/O Module with Encryption from EMC
(Hardware Version: B; Firmware Versions:)
(When installed, initialized and configured as specified in the Security Policy Section 3)

Validated to FIPS
Consolidated Validation Certificate

Security Policy
Hardware12/01/
12/02/12/1/Overall Level: 1

-Design Assurance: Level 3
-Mitigation of Other Attacks: N/A
-Tested Configuration(s): N/A

-FIPS Approved algorithms: AES (Cert. #); KTS (AES Cert. #); HMAC (Cert. #); SHS (Cert. #)

-Other algorithms: N/A
Multi-Chip Embedded

"Dell EMC Data at Rest Encryption provides hardware-based, on-array, back-end encryption for Dell EMC storage systems, including the Symmetrix VMAX. Data at Rest Encryption protects information from unauthorized access when drives are physically removed from the system and also offers a convenient means of decommissioning all drives in the system at healthplum.us EMC 6Gb/s SAS I/O modules implement AES-XTS bit encryption on all drives in the system."
KONA I Co., Ltd.
KONA I, 6F, 30, Eunhaeng-Ro
Yeongdeungpo-Gu
Seoul
South Korea (ROK)

Irene Namkung
TEL: +82 (0)2
FAX: +82 (0)2

CST Lab: NVLAP KONA N41M0
(Hardware Version: Infineon SLE97CNFX1M00PEA22; Firmware Versions: KONA N41M0 v and PKI Applet v)

Validated to FIPS
Consolidated Validation Certificate

Security Policy
Hardware11/25/11/24/Overall Level: 3

-Tested Configuration(s): N/A

-FIPS Approved algorithms: DRBG (Cert. #); Triple-DES (Cert. #); Triple-DES MAC (Triple-DES Cert. #, vendor affirmed); AES (Cert. #); HMAC (Cert. #); SHS (Cert. #); RSA (Certs. # and #); ECDSA (Cert. #)

-Other algorithms: NDRNG; AES (Cert. #, key wrapping); EC Diffie-Hellman (key agreement; key establishment methodology provides between and bits of encryption strength)
Single Chip

"The KONA N41M0 smart card can be employed in solutions which provide secure PKI (public key infrastructure) and digital signature technology. KONA N41M0 serves as highly portable physical forms which enhances the security of network access and ensures secure electronic communications. KONA N41M0 supports on-card Triple DES, AES, ECC and bit RSA algorithms with on-card key generation. The KONA N41M0 smart card is Java-based smart cards for physical and logical access, e-transactions and other applications, which is compliant to Java Card v and GlobalPlatform "
KONA I Co., Ltd.
KONA I, 6F, 30, Eunhaeng-Ro
Yeongdeungpo-Gu
Seoul
South Korea (ROK)

Irene Namkung
TEL: +82 (0)2
FAX: +82 (0)2

CST Lab: NVLAP KONA N41M0
(Hardware Version: Infineon SLE97CNFX1M00PEA22; Firmware Versions: KONA N41M0 v and Demonstration Applet v)
(The module generates cryptographic keys whose strengths are modified by available entropy)

Validated to FIPS
Consolidated Validation Certificate

Security Policy
Hardware11/20/11/19/Overall Level: 3

-Tested Configuration(s): N/A

-FIPS Approved algorithms: DRBG (Cert. #); Triple-DES (Cert. #); Triple-DES MAC (Triple-DES Cert. #, vendor affirmed); AES (Cert. #); HMAC (Cert. #); SHS (Cert. #); RSA (Certs. # and #); ECDSA (Cert. #)

-Other algorithms: NDRNG; RSA (key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides bits of encryption strength); AES (Cert. #, key wrapping); EC Diffie-Hellman (key agreement; key establishment methodology provides between and bits of encryption strength)
Single Chip

"The KONA N41M0 smart card can be employed in solutions which provide secure PKI (public key infrastructure) and digital signature technology. KONA N41M0 serves as highly portable physical forms which enhances the security of network access and ensures secure electronic communications. KONA N41M0 supports on-card Triple DES, AES, ECC and bit RSA algorithms with on-card key generation. The KONA N41M0 smart card is Java-based smart cards for physical and logical access, e-transactions and other applications, which is compliant to Java Card v and GlobalPlatform "
Red Cocoa II L.L.C.
Cody Drive
Suite G-2
Lincoln, NE
USA

Andy Lenhart
TEL:
FAX: n/a

Mark Nispel
TEL:
FAX: n/a

CST Lab: NVLAP C-ACE
(Hardware Version: STM32FOG; Firmware Version: Bootloader: ; Application: )

Validated to FIPS
Consolidated Validation Certificate

Security Policy
Hardware11/16/11/15/Overall Level: 2

-Mitigation of Other Attacks: N/A
-Tested Configuration(s): N/A

-FIPS Approved algorithms: AES (Cert. #); DSA (Cert. #); SHS (Cert. #)

-Other algorithms: NDRNG; AES MAC (AES Cert. #, vendor affirmed; P25 AES OTAR); AES (Cert. #, key wrapping)
Single Chip

"The C-ACE module is a single-chip cryptographic engine designed to be implemented in a UnHackMe 9.60 Crack Build 660 Full + Serial Key Download Free compliant with the APCO Project 25 Over-The-Air Rekeying (OTAR) protocol."
Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.

Samsung-ro
Yeongtong-gu
Suwon-si, Gyeonggi-do
South Korea

Changsup Ahn
TEL: +
FAX: N/A

Jisoon Park
TEL: +
FAX: N/A

CST Lab: NVLAP Samsung CryptoCore Module
(Software Version: )
(When operated in FIPS mode. The module generates cryptographic keys whose strengths are modified by available entropy)

Validated to FIPS
Consolidated Validation Certificate

Security Policy
Software11/16/
03/22/
03/24/3/23/Overall Level: 1

-Physical Security: N/A
-Mitigation of Other Attacks: N/A
-Tested Configuration(s): Ubuntu running on Lenovo Tp with Intel i7
Tizen running on Samsung UN55JU with Samsung Hawk-MU (single-user mode)

-FIPS Approved algorithms: AES (Certs. # and #); CVL (Certs. # and #); DRBG (Certs. # and #); DSA (Certs. # and #); ECDSA (Certs. # and #); HMAC (Certs. # and #); RSA (Certs. # and #); SHS (Certs. # and #); Triple-DES (Certs. # and #)

-Other algorithms: DES; Diffie-Hellman (key agreement; key establishment methodology provides between bits and bits of encryption strength; non-compliant less than bits of encryption strength); EC Diffie-Hellman (CVL Certs. # and #, key agreement; key establishment methodology provides between bits and bits of encryption strength; non-compliant less than bits of encryption strength); HMAC-MD5; IBS; MD5; RC4; RSA (key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides bits or bits of encryption strength; non-compliant less than bits of encryption strength); SNOW2; NDRNG; RNG
Multi-Chip Stand Alone

"A multipurpose cryptographic library which provides symmetric/asymmetric cipher, message digest, key agreement, and PRNG services."
OpenSSL Validation Services
Mount Ephraim Road
Adamstown, MD
USA

Steve Marquess
TEL:

CST Lab: NVLAP OpenSSL FIPS Object Module RE
(Software Version: or )
(When built, installed, protected and initialized as assumed by the Crypto Officer role and as specified in the provided Security Policy. Appendix A of the provided Security Policy specifies the actual distribution tar file containing the source code of this module. There shall be no additions, deletions or alterations to the tar file contents as used during module build. The distribution tar file shall be verified as specified in Appendix A of the provided Security Policy. Installation and protection shall be completed as specified in Appendix A of the provided Security Policy. Initialization shall be invoked as per Section 4 of the provided Security Policy. Any deviation from specified verification, protection, installation and initialization procedures will result in a non FIPS compliant module)

Validated to FIPS
Consolidated Validation Certificate

Security Policy
Software11/13/
01/25/
04/28/
01/10/
01/20/
01/30/
03/17/
04/25/1/29/Overall Level: 1

-Roles, Services, and Authentication: Level 2
-Physical Security: N/A
-Design Assurance: Level 3
-Mitigation of Other Attacks: N/A
-Tested Configuration(s): TS-Linux running on ArmTid (ARMv4) (gcc Compiler Version )
iOS bit running on Apple A7 (ARMv8) without NEON and Crypto Extensions (clang Compiler Version )
iOS bit running on Apple A7 (ARMv8) with NEON and Crypto Extensions (clang Compiler Version )
VxWorks running on Freescale P (PPC) (gcc Compiler Version )
iOS bit running on Apple A7 (ARMv8) without NEON (clang Compiler Version )
iOS bit running on Apple A7 (ARMv8) with NEON (clang Compiler Version )
Android bit running on Qualcomm APQ (ARMv7) without NEON (gcc Compiler Version )
Android bit running on Qualcomm APQ (ARMv7) with NEON (gcc Compiler Version )
Android bit running on SAMSUNG Exynos (ARMv8) without NEON and Crypto Extensions (gcc Compiler Version )
Android bit running on SAMSUNG Exynos (ARMv8) with NEON and Crypto Extensions (gcc Compiler Version )
FreeBSD running on Intel Xeon EL (x86) without AES-NI (clang Compiler Version )
FreeBSD running on Intel Xeon EL (x86) with AES-NI (clang Compiler Version )
Yocto Linux running on Freescale healthplum.us6 (ARMv7) without NEON (gcc Compiler Version )
Yocto Linux running on Freescale healthplum.us6 (ARMv7) with NEON (gcc Compiler Version )
Linux running on ARMEJS (ARMv5) (gcc Compiler Version )
Timesys running on PowerPC (PPC) (gcc Compiler Version )
uClinux-dist running on Marvell Feroceon 88FR (ARMv5TE) (gcc Compiler Version )
uClinux-dist running on Marvell Armada (ARMv7) (gcc Compiler Version )
uClibc running on ARMEJS (ARMv5TEJ) (gcc Compiler Version )
uClibc running on Marvell PJ4 (ARMv7) (gcc Compiler Version )
uClibc running on ARMT (ARMv4T) (gcc Compiler Version )
LMOS running on Intel Xeon E (x86) without AES-NI (gcc Compiler Version )
LMOS running on Intel Xeon E (x86) with AES-NI (gcc Compiler Version )
Debian running on Marvell Mohawk (ARMv5TE) (gcc Compiler Version )
Linux running on Atmel ATSAMA5D35 (ARMv7) (gcc Compiler Version )
Linux running on Atmel ATSAM9G45 (ARMv5TEJ) (gcc Compiler Version )
Android 32­bit running on Intel Atom ZF (x86) (gcc Compiler Version )
Linux running on ARM Cortex A9 (ARMv7) without NEON (gcc Compiler Version )
Linux running on ARM Cortex A9 (ARMv7) with NEON (gcc Compiler Version )
LMOS under VMware ESXi running on Intel Xeon EL (x86) without AES-NI (gcc Compiler Version )
LMOS under VMware ESXi running on Intel Xeon EL (x86) with AES-NI (gcc Compiler Version ) (single-user mode)

-FIPS Approved algorithms: AES (Certs. # and #); CVL (Certs. # and #); DRBG (Certs. # and #); DSA (Certs. # and #); ECDSA (Certs. # and #); HMAC (Certs. # and #); RSA (Certs. # and #); SHS (Certs. # and #); Triple-DES (Certs. # and #)

-Other algorithms: EC Diffie-Hellman; RSA (encrypt/decrypt); RNG
Multi-Chip Stand Alone

"The OpenSSL FIPS Object Module RE is a general purpose cryptographic module delivered as open source code. It is designed for ease of use with the popular OpenSSL cryptographic library and toolkit and is available for use without charge for a wide variety of platforms. The basic validation can also be extended quickly and affordably to accommodate new platforms and many types of modifications."
SUSE, LLC
10 Canal Park, Suite
Cambridge, Massachusetts
USA

Thomas Biege
TEL: +49

Michael Hager
TEL: +49 80

CST Lab: NVLAP SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 12 - OpenSSH Client Module
(Software Version: )
(When operated in FIPS mode with module SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 12 - OpenSSL Module validated to FIPS under Cert. # operating in FIPS mode)

Validated to FIPS
Consolidated Validation Certificate

Security Policy

Vendor Product Link
Software11/13/11/12/Overall Level: 1

-Physical Security: N/A
-Mitigation of Other Attacks: N/A
-Tested Configuration(s): SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 12 running on HP ProLiant DLe Gen8 with Intel Xeon CPU with PAA
SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 12 running on HP ProLiant DLe Gen8 with Intel Xeon CPU without PAA (single-user mode)

-FIPS Approved algorithms: CVL (Cert. #)

-Other algorithms: ChaCha20; Poly; UMAC; Curvebased ECDH; Ed
Multi-Chip Stand Alone

"SUSE client software that provides encrypted network communication using the SSH protocol."
SUSE, LLC
10 Canal Park, Suite
Cambridge, Massachusetts
USA

Thomas Biege
TEL: +49

Michael Hager
TEL: +49 80

CST Lab: NVLAP SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 12 - OpenSSH Server Module
(Software Version: )
(When operated in FIPS mode with module SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 12 - OpenSSL Module validated to FIPS under Cert. # operating in FIPS mode)

Validated to FIPS
Consolidated Validation Certificate

Security Policy

Vendor Product Link
Software11/13/11/12/Overall Level: 1

-Physical Security: N/A
-Mitigation of Other Attacks: N/A
-Tested Configuration(s): SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 12 running on HP ProLiant DLe Gen8 with Intel Xeon CPU with PAA
SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 12 running on HP ProLiant DLe Gen8 with Intel Xeon CPU without PAA (single-user mode)

-FIPS Approved algorithms: CVL (Cert. #)

-Other algorithms: ChaCha20; Poly; UMAC; Curvebased ECDH; Ed
Multi-Chip Stand Alone

"SUSE server software that provides encrypted network communication using the SSH protocol."
Feitian Technologies Co., Ltd.
Floor 17th, Tower B, Huizhi Mansion, No.9 Xueqing Road
Haidian District, Beijing, Beijing
China

Peng Jie
TEL: +
FAX: +

Tibi Zhang
TEL: +(86)
FAX: +(86)

CST Lab: NVLAP FT-JCOS (Feitian Java Card Platform)
(Hardware Versions: P/Ns SLE78CLFXPM [1], SLE77CLFXPM [2] and SLE78CLUFXPHM [3]; Firmware Versions: [1], [2] and [3])

Validated to FIPS
Consolidated Validation Certificate

Security Policy
Hardware11/05/11/4/Overall Level: 3

-Tested Configuration(s): N/A

-FIPS Approved algorithms: AES (Certs. #, #, #, #, # and #); DRBG (Certs. #, # and #); Microsoft office 2010 - Activators Patch (Certs. #9, #42 and #43); RSA (Certs. #, # and #); SHS (Cert. #); Triple-DES (Certs. #, # and #); Triple-DES MAC (Triple-DES Certs. #, # and #, vendor affirmed)

-Other algorithms: NDRNG; AES (Certs. #, # and #, key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides bits of encryption strength)
Single Chip

"The FT-JCOS (Feitian Java Card Platform) cryptographic module, validated to FIPS overall Level 3, is a single chip smartcard module implementing the JavaCard and Global Platform operational environment, with Card Manager also considered as Issuer Security Domain (ISD), a demonstration Applet used to demonstrate the cryptographic functions of the module, and a supplementary security domain that is also considered as Applet Provider Security Domain (APSD).The FT-JCOS exposes PKI and MoC APIs and is designed for high performance Government, Enterprise and Financial smartcard applications."
RSA, the Security Division of EMC
Middlesex Turnpike
Bedford, MA
USA

Rohit Mathur
TEL: +61 7

CST Lab: NVLAP RSA BSAFE(R) Crypto-J JSAFE and JCE Software Module
(Software Versions: and )
(When operated in FIPS Mode. No assurance of the minimum strength of generated keys)

Validated to FIPS
Consolidated Validation Certificate

Security Policy
Software10/30/
04/12/
01/24/
02/09/1/23/Overall Level: 1

-Roles, Services, and Authentication: Level 2
-Physical Security: N/A
-Design Assurance: Level 3
-Tested Configuration(s): Oracle(R) JRE on Microsoft(R) Windows (bit) running on an HP ENVY 15
Google Dalvik(tm) JRE on Google(tm) Android(tm) ARMv7 (bit) running on Google Nexus 7(tm) (Wi-Fi, )
OpenJDK on CentOS (bit) running on a Dell(TM) PowerEdge(TM) (single-user mode)

-FIPS Approved algorithms: AES (Cert. #); CVL (Certs. # and #); DRBG (Cert. #); DSA (Cert. #); ECDSA (Cert. #); HMAC (Cert. #); KTS (AES Cert. #); PBKDF (vendor affirmed); RSA (Cert. #); SHS (Cert. #); Triple-DES (Cert. #)

-Other algorithms: AES (non-compliant); DES; DESX; Diffie-Hellman (CVL Cert. #, key agreement); EC Diffie-Hellman (CVL Cert. #, key agreement); ECIES; RNG (non-compliant); HMAC-MD5; MD2; MD5; PKCS#5; PKCS#12; RC2; RC4; RC5; RSA (key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides or bits of encryption strength); RSA (non-compliant); RIPEMD; scrypt; Shamir Secret Sharing; Triple-DES (non-compliant)
Multi-Chip Stand Alone

"RSA BSAFE Crypto-J security software is designed to help protect sensitive data as it is stored using strong encryption techniques to provide a persistent level of protection. It supports a wide range of industry standard encryption algorithms offering Java developers the flexibility to choose the option most appropriate to meet their requirements."
RSA, the Security Division of EMC
Middlesex Turnpike
Bedford, MA
USA

Rohit Mathur
TEL: +61 7

CST Lab: NVLAP RSA BSAFE(R) Crypto-J JSAFE and Office 2013 download free office 2013 download - Crack Key For U Software Module
(Software Versions: and )
(When operated in FIPS Mode. No assurance of the minimum strength of generated keys)

Validated to FIPS
Consolidated Validation Certificate

Security Policy
Software10/30/
04/12/
01/24/
02/09/1/23/Overall Level: 1

-Physical Security: N/A
-Design Assurance: Level 3
-Tested Configuration(s): Oracle(R) JRE on Microsoft(R) Windows (bit) running on an HP ENVY 15
Google Dalvik(tm) JRE on Google(tm) Android(tm) ARMv7 (bit) running on Google Nexus 7(tm) (Wi-Fi, )
OpenJDK on CentOS (bit) running on a Dell(TM) PowerEdge(TM) (single-user mode)

-FIPS Approved algorithms: AES (Cert. #); CVL (Certs. # and #); DRBG (Cert. #); DSA (Cert. #); ECDSA (Cert. #); HMAC (Cert. #); KTS (AES Cert. #); PBKDF (vendor affirmed); RSA (Cert. #); SHS (Cert. #); Triple-DES (Cert. #)

-Other algorithms: AES (non-compliant); DES; DESX; Diffie-Hellman (CVL Cert. #, key agreement); EC Diffie-Hellman (CVL Cert. #, key agreement); ECIES; RNG (non-compliant); HMAC-MD5; MD2; MD5; PKCS#5; PKCS#12; RC2; RC4; RC5; RSA (key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides or bits of encryption strength); RSA (non-compliant); RIPEMD; scrypt; Shamir Secret Sharing; Triple-DES (non-compliant)
Multi-Chip Stand Alone

"RSA BSAFE Crypto-J security software is designed to help protect sensitive data as it is stored using strong encryption techniques to provide a persistent level of protection. It supports a wide range of industry standard encryption algorithms offering Java developers the flexibility to choose the option most appropriate to meet their requirements."
Pure Storage, Inc.
Castro Street, Suite
Mountain View, CA
USA

Marco Sanvido
TEL:
FAX:

Ethan Miller
TEL:
FAX:

CST Lab: NVLAP Purity Encryption Module
(Hardware Version: Intel Xeon x64 CPU E v2; Software Version: )

Validated to FIPS
Consolidated Validation Certificate

Security Policy

Vendor Product Link
Software-Hybrid10/30/10/29/Overall Level: 1

-Design Assurance: Level 2
-Tested Configuration(s): Purity Operating Environment 4 running on a Dell PowerEdge R with PAA (single-user mode)

-FIPS Approved algorithms: AES (Cert. #); DRBG (Cert. #); HMAC (Cert. #); KTS (Cert. #); SHS (Cert. #)

-Other algorithms: NDRNG
Multi-Chip Stand Alone

"Purity Encryption Module is a standalone cryptographic module for the Purity Operating Environment (POE). POE powers Pure Storage's FlashArray family of products witch provide economical all-flash storage. Purity Encryption Module enables FlashArray to support always-on, inline encryption of data with an internal key management scheme that requires no user intervention."
ViaSat, Inc.
El Camino Real
Carlsbad, CA
USA

Savitha Naik
TEL:
FAX:

David Suksumrit
TEL:
FAX:

CST Lab: NVLAP Enhanced Bandwidth Efficient Modem (EBEM) Cryptographic Module
(Hardware Versions: P/Ns Version 1, with ESEM Version 1, Version 1, Version 1, with ESEM Version 1, Version 1, Version 1, with ESEM Version 1, Version 1, Version 1, with ESEM Version 1, Version 1, and ; Firmware Version: or )
(The tamper evident seal installed as indicated in the Security Policy for the optional ESEM feature)

Validated to FIPS
Consolidated Validation Certificate

Security Policy

Vendor Product Link
Hardware10/30/
12/14/
11/08/11/7/Overall Level: 2

-Cryptographic Module Specification: Level 3
-Design Assurance: Level 3
-Mitigation of Other Attacks: N/A
-Tested Configuration(s): N/A

-FIPS Approved algorithms: AES (Certs. #, # and #); CVL (Certs. # and #); DRBG (Cert. #); ECDSA (Cert. #); HMAC (Cert. #); KAS (Cert. #60); KTS (AES Cert. #; key establishment methodology provides or bits of encryption strength); SHS (Certs. #, # and #)

-Other algorithms: NDRNG; EC Diffie-Hellman (key agreement; key establishment methodology provides bits of encryption strength; non-compliant less than bits of encryption strength); Diffie-Hellman (non-compliant); AES (non-compliant); Triple-DES (non-compliant); SHS (non-compliant); DSA (non-compliant); RSA (non-compliant); ECDSA (non-compliant); HMAC (non-compliant); PBKDF (non-compliant); HMAC MD5; MD5; DES
Multi-Chip Embedded

"The Enhanced Bandwidth Efficient Modem (EBEM) is the only commercially-available bandwith efficient modem certified to MIL-STDB and compliant with STANAG ed. 3. The MD defines a new military standard in FDMA for high-speed satellite communications. Using military and commercial satellites at X- C- Ku- and Ka-band frequencies, the MD delivers much-needed capacity for the military's high speed broadband and multimedia transmissions."
Silent Circle
Fairfax Corner West Ave.
Suite
Fairfax, VA
USA

Eric Carter

Allen Stone

CST Lab: NVLAP Mobile Application Cryptographic Module
(Software Version: )
(When operated in FIPS mode. This validation entry is a non-security relevant modification to Cert. # The module generates cryptographic keys whose strengths are modified by available entropy.)

Validated to FIPS
Consolidated Validation Certificate

Security Policy
Software10/30/
02/11/
06/20/
03/13/6/19/Overall Level: 1

-Physical Security: N/A
-Mitigation of Other Attacks: N/A
-Tested Configuration(s): Tested as meeting Level 1 with Android running on a Galaxy Nexus
iOS running on a iPad 3
iOS 6 running on a iPad 3
iOS 7 running on a iPad 3 (single-user mode)

-FIPS Approved algorithms: AES (Certs. # and #); CVL (Certs. #28 and #29); DRBG (Certs. # and #); DSA (Certs. # and #); ECDSA (Certs. # and #); HMAC (Certs. # and #); RSA (Certs. # and #); SHS (Certs. # and #); Triple-DES (Certs. # and #)

-Other algorithms: RSA (key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides between and bits of encryption strength; non-compliant less than bits of encryption strength); EC Diffie-Hellman (key agreement; key establishment methodology provides between and bits of encryption strength; non-compliant less than bits of encryption strength); RNG
Multi-Chip Stand Alone

"The Silent Circle Mobile Application Cryptographic Module provides cryptographic functions for Silent Circle mobile applications, including Silent Phone Silent Text, Silent World, Silent VPN, and Silent Manager."
SUSE, LLC
10 Canal Park, Suite
Cambridge, Massachusetts
USA

Thomas Biege
TEL: +49

Michael Hager
TEL: +49 80

CST Lab: NVLAP SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 12 libgcrypt Cryptographic Module
(Software Version: )
(When operated in FIPS mode. The module generates cryptographic keys whose strengths are modified by available entropy)

Validated to FIPS
Consolidated Validation Certificate

Security Policy

Vendor Product Link
Software10/30/10/29/Overall Level: 1

-Physical Security: N/A
-Tested Configuration(s): SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 12 running on HP Proliant DLe Gen8 with PAA
SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 12 running on HP Proliant DLe Gen8 without PAA (single-user mode)

-FIPS Approved algorithms: AES (Certs. # and #); DRBG (Certs. #, #, # and #); DSA (Cert. #); ECDSA (Cert. #); HMAC (Certs. #, #, # and #); RSA (Cert. #); SHS (Certs. #, #, # and #); Triple-DES (Cert. #)

-Other algorithms: AES (Certs. # and #, key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides between and bits of encryption strength); AES-GCM (non-compliant); ARC4; Blowfish; Camellia; CAST5; CRC32; DES; EC-Gost; EdDSA; ElGamal; Gost; IDEA; MD4; MD5; OpenPGP S2K Salted and Iterated/salted; RC2; RIPE-MD ; RSA (key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides between and bits of encryption strength; non-compliant less than bits of encryption strength); Salsa20; SEED; Serpent; Scrypt; Tiger; Twofish; Whirlpool
Multi-Chip Stand Alone

"SUSE Libgcrypt is a general purpose cryptographic library based on the code from GnuPG."
Accellion, Inc.
Embarcadero Road,
Suite
Palo Alto, CA
USA

Prateek Jain
TEL: +
FAX: +

CST Lab: NVLAP Accellion Cryptographic Module
(Software Version: FTALIB_4_0_1)
(When operated in FIPS mode)

Validated to FIPS
Consolidated Validation Certificate

Security Policy
Software10/30/10/29/Overall Level: 1

-Physical Security: N/A
-Design Assurance: Level 2
-Mitigation of Other Attacks: N/A
-Tested Configuration(s): Red Hat Enterprise Linux 5 on VMware ESXi running on a Dell Inc. PowerEdge R (single-user mode)

-FIPS Approved algorithms: AES (Certs. #, #, and #); CVL (Certs. # and #); DRBG (Cert. #); ECDSA (Cert. #); HMAC (Certs. # and #); RSA (Cert. #); SHS (Certs. # and #); Triple-DES (Cert. #)

-Other algorithms: NDRNG; AES (Cert. #, key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides bits of encryption strength); RSA (key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides or bits of encryption strength; non-compliant less than bits of encryption strength); AES (non-compliant); DRBG (non-compliant); DSA (non-compliant); ECDSA (non-compliant); HMAC (non-compliant); RNG Ace Utilities 6.5.0 Build 298 Key + Keygen Key Free Download 2021 RSA (non-compliant); SHS (non-compliant); Triple-DES (non-compliant); PKCS #3 Diffie-Hellman; adler32; Blowfish; CAMELLIA; CAST5; crc32; crc32b; DES; DESX; fnv; fnv; gost; haval; IDEA; joaat; MDC2; MD2; MD4; MD5; RC2; RC4; RC4-HMAC-MD5; RIPEMD; SEED; snefru; snefru; SSLeay; Tiger; Whirlpool; rand(); mtrand()
Multi-Chip Stand Alone

"Accellion Cryptographic Module is a key component of Accellion's secure collaboration solution that enables enterprises to securely share and transfer files. Extensive tracking and reporting tools allow compliance with SOX, HIPAA, FDA and GLB regulations while providing enterprise grade security and ease of use."
Hitachi, Ltd.
Nakazato, Odawara-shi
Kanagawa-ken
Japan

Hajime Sato
TEL: +
FAX: +

CST Lab: NVLAP Hitachi Virtual Storage Platform (VSP) Encryption Module
(Hardware Versions: P/N: A(BS12GE) Version: B/D4, B/D5, B/D4a, B/D5a, B/D6, B/D7 or B/D8; Firmware Versions:, )
(The tamper evident seals installed as indicated in the Security Policy)

Validated to FIPS
Consolidated Validation Certificate

Security Policy
Hardware10/29/
02/25/
04/07/
08/04/4/6/Overall Level: 2

-Mitigation of Other Attacks: N/A
-Tested Configuration(s): N/A

-FIPS Approved algorithms: AES (Cert. #); HMAC (Cert. #); KTS (AES Cert. #); SHS (Cert. #)

-Other algorithms: N/A
Multi-Chip Embedded

"The Hitachi Virtual Storage Platform (VSP) Encryption Module provides high speed data at rest encryption for Hitachi storage."
Motorola Solutions, Inc.
East Algonquin Road
Schaumburg, IL
USA

Ken Fuchs
TEL:

CST Lab: NVLAP Astro Subscriber Motorola Advanced Crypto Engine (MACE) - Security Level 3
(Hardware Versions: P/Ns Y01, Y03, Y05 and T05; Firmware Versions: R and [R or (R and R)])
(When operated in FIPS mode and configured to Overall Level 3 per Security Policy)

Validated to FIPS
Consolidated Validation Certificate

Security Policy
Hardware10/27/
01/30/1/29/Overall Level: 3

-Mitigation of Other Attacks: N/A
-Tested Configuration(s): N/A

-FIPS Approved algorithms: AES (Certs. # and #); DRBG (Cert. #); HMAC (Cert. #); RSA (Cert. #); SHS (Certs. # and #)

-Other algorithms: AES MAC (AES Cert. #, vendor affirmed; P25 AES OTAR); LFSR; NDRNG
Single Chip

"The MACE cryptographic processor is used in security modules embedded in Motorola's Astro family of radio systems products. It provides secure voice and data capabilities as well as APCO Over-The-Air-Rekeying and advanced key management."
Motorola Solutions, Inc.
East Algonquin Road
Schaumburg, IL
USA

Ken Fuchs
TEL:

CST Lab: NVLAP Astro Subscriber Motorola Advanced Crypto Engine (MACE) - Security Level 2
(Hardware Versions: P/Ns Y01, Y03, Y05 and T05; Firmware Versions: R and [R or (R and R)])
(When operated in FIPS mode and configured to Overall Level 2 per Security Policy)

Validated to FIPS
Consolidated Validation Certificate

Security Policy
Hardware10/27/
01/30/1/29/Overall Level: 2

-Roles, Services, and Authentication: Level 3
-Physical Security: Level 3
-EMI/EMC: Level 3
-Design Assurance: Level 3
-Mitigation of Other Attacks: N/A
-Tested Configuration(s): N/A

-FIPS Approved algorithms: AES (Certs. # and #); DRBG (Cert. #); HMAC (Cert. #); RSA (Cert. #); SHS (Certs. # and #)

-Other algorithms: AES MAC (AES Cert. #, vendor affirmed; P25 AES OTAR); LFSR; NDRNG
Single Chip

"The MACE cryptographic processor is used in security modules embedded in Motorola's Astro family of radio systems products. It provides secure voice and data capabilities as well as APCO Over-The-Air-Rekeying and advanced key management."


CST Lab: NVLAP

Validated to FIPS
Consolidated Validation Certificate

Security Policy
Hardware10/27/
04/11/10/26/Overall Level: 2

Multi-chip standalone
Barracuda Networks
Winchester Boulevard
Campbell, CA
USA

Andrea Cannon
TEL:
FAX:

CST Lab: NVLAP Barracuda Cryptographic Software Module
(Software Version: )
(No assurance of the minimum strength of generated keys)

Validated to FIPS
Consolidated Validation Certificate

Security Policy
Software10/22/
12/08/12/7/Overall Level: 1

-Roles, Services, and Authentication: Level 2
-Physical Security: N/A
-Design Assurance: Level 3
-Mitigation of Other Attacks: N/A
-Tested Configuration(s): Tested as meeting Level 1 with Barracuda OS v running on a BNHW without PAA
Barracuda OS v running on a BNHW with PAA
Barracuda OS v running on a BNHW without PAA
Barracuda OS v running on a BNHW with PAA
Barracuda NextGen Firewall and Control Center OS 7 under Microsoft Windows (bit) Hyper-V running on a Dell PowerEdge R with PAA
Barracuda NextGen Firewall and Control Center OS 7 under Microsoft Windows (bit) Hyper-V running on a Dell PowerEdge R without PAA (single-user mode)

-FIPS Approved algorithms: AES (Certs. # and #); CVL (Certs. # and #); DRBG (Certs. # and #); DSA (Certs. # and #); ECDSA (Certs. # and #); HMAC (Certs. # and #); RSA (Certs. #, # and #); SHS (Certs. # and #); Triple-DES (Certs. # and #)

-Other algorithms: EC Diffie-Hellman (shared secret computation); RSA (key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides or bits of encryption strength)
Multi-Chip Stand Alone

"The Barracuda Cryptographic Software Module is a cryptographic software library that provides fundamental cryptographic functions for applications in Barracuda security products that require FIPS approved cryptographic functions."
Aruba a Hewlett Packard Enterprise Company
Crossman Avenue
Sunnyvale, CA
USA

Steve Weingart
TEL:

CST Lab: NVLAP Aruba 7XXX Series Controllers with ArubaOS FIPS Firmware
(Hardware Versions: Aruba F1, Aruba USF1, Aruba F1, Aruba USF1, Aruba F1, Aruba USF1, Aruba F1, Aruba USF1, Aruba F1 and Aruba USF1 with FIPS kit ; Firmware Versions: ArubaOS FIPS and ArubaOS FIPS)
(When operated in FIPS mode with tamper evident labels installed as indicated in the Security Policy)

Validated to FIPS
Consolidated Validation Certificate

Security Policy
Hardware10/22/
01/14/
07/06/7/5/Overall Level: 2

-Mitigation of Other Attacks: N/A
-Tested Configuration(s): N/A

-FIPS Approved algorithms: AES (Certs. #, #, # and #); CVL (Certs. # and #); DRBG (Cert. #); ECDSA (Certs. # and #); HMAC (Certs. #, #, # and #); KBKDF (Cert. #32); RSA (Certs. #, #, #, # and #); SHS (Certs. #, #, #, # and #); Triple-DES (Certs. #, #, # and #)

-Other algorithms: DES; Diffie-Hellman (key agreement; key establishment methodology provides bits of encryption strength; non-compliant less than bits of encryption strength); EC Diffie-Hellman (key agreement; key establishment methodology provides or bits of encryption strength); HMAC-MD5; MD5; NDRNG; RC4; RSA (key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides bits of encryption strength)
Multi-Chip Stand Alone

"Aruba's family of Mobility Controllers are network infrastructure devices providing secure, scalable solutions for enterprise Wi-Fi, network security policy enforcement, VPN services, and wireless intrusion detection and prevention. Mobility controllers serve as central points of authentication, encryption, access control, and network coordination for all mobile network services."
Oracle Corporation
Oracle Parkway
Redwood Shores, CA
USA

Nikhil Suares
TEL: ()

CST Lab: NVLAP Acme Packet and Acme Packet
(Hardware Version: A1; Firmware Versions: ECx and ECxM1)
(When Panda VPN Free Download in FIPS mode)

Validated to FIPS
Consolidated Validation Certificate

Security Policy
Hardware10/21/10/20/Overall Level: 2

-Design Assurance: Level 3
-Mitigation of Other Attacks: N/A
-Tested Configuration(s): N/A

-FIPS Approved algorithms: AES (Certs. # and #); CVL (Certs. # and #); DRBG (Certs. # and #); HMAC (Certs. #, #, # and #); RSA (Certs. # and #); SHS (Certs. #, #, # and #); Triple-DES (Certs. # and #)

-Other algorithms: DES; ARC4; HMAC-MD5; SNMP KDF (non-compliant); RSA (key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides bits of encryption strength; non-compliant less than bits of encryption strength); Diffie-Hellman (key establishment methodology provides bits of encryption strength; non-compliant less than bits of encryption strength); NDRNG
Multi-Chip Stand Alone

"The Acme Packet and are one rack unit (1U) platforms that feature Oracle's purpose-built hardware design tightly integrated with Acme Packet OS, to provide the critical controls for delivering trusted, real-time communications - voice, video, and application data sessions - across Internet Protocol (IP) network borders."
SiCore Technologies Inc.
Finn Court
Farmingdale, NY
USA

Godfrey Vassallo
TEL:

CST Lab: NVLAP SHIELD Secure Coprocessor
(Hardware Version: SHIELD Secure CoProcessor V; Firmware Versions: MFF V, FPGA V, SC V)

Validated to FIPS
Consolidated Validation Certificate

Security Policy
Hardware10/14/10/13/Overall Level: 3

-Design Assurance: Level 4
-Tested Configuration(s): N/A

-FIPS Approved algorithms: AES (Cert. #); RSA (Cert. #); SHS (Cert. #)

-Other algorithms: RSA (key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides bits of encryption strength)
Multi-Chip Embedded

"A secure co-processor with a PCI Express Interface"
LogRhythm
Pearl East Circle
Boulder, CO
USA

Emily Dobson
TEL:

CST Lab: NVLAP LogRhythm FIPS Object Module
(Software Version: )
(When built, installed, protected and initialized as assumed by the Crypto Officer role and as specified in the provided Security Policy. Appendix A of the provided Security Policy specifies the actual distribution tar file containing the source code of this module. There shall be no additions, deletions or alterations to the tar file contents as used during module build. The distribution tar file shall be verified as specified in Appendix A of the provided Security Policy. Installation and protection shall be completed as specified in Appendix A of the provided Security Policy. Initialization shall be invoked as per Section 4 of the provided Security Policy. Any deviation DeskSoft SmartCapture 3.17.4 Crack specified verification, protection, installation and initialization procedures will result in a non FIPS compliant module)

Validated to FIPS
Consolidated Validation Certificate

Security Policy
Software09/30/
05/05/5/4/Overall Level: 1

-Roles, Services, and Authentication: Level 2
-Physical Security: N/A
-Design Assurance: Level 3
-Mitigation of Other Attacks: N/A
-Tested Configuration(s): Tested as meeting Level 1 with Tested as meeting Level 1 with Android running on Qualcomm QSD (ARMv7) without NEON (gcc Compiler Version )
Android running on Qualcomm QSD (ARMv7) with NEON (gcc Compiler Version )
Microsoft Windows 7 (32 bit) running on Intel Celeron (Microsoft 32 bit C/C++ Optimizing Compiler Version )
uCLinux running on ARM T (ARMv4) (gcc Compiler Version )
Fedora 14 running on Intel Core i5 with PAA (gcc Compiler Version )
HP-UX 11i (32 bit) running on Intel Itanium 2 (HP C/aC++ BB)
HP-UX 11i (64 bit) running on Intel Itanium 2 (HP C/aC++ BB)
Ubuntu running on Intel Pentium T (gcc Compiler Version )
Ubuntu (32 bit) running on Intel Pentium T (gcc Compiler Version )
Ubuntu (64 bit) running on Intel Pentium T (gcc Compiler Version )
Android running on NVIDIA Tegra T20 (ARMv7) (gcc Compiler Version )
Linux running on PowerPC ec3 (gcc Compiler Version )
Microsoft Windows 7 (64 bit) running on Intel Pentium 4 (Microsoft C/C++ Optimizing Compiler Version )
Ubuntu running on Intel Core i5 with PAA (32 bit) (gcc Compiler Version )
Linux running on PowerPC32 e (gcc Compiler Version )
Android running on OMAP (ARMv7) with NEON (gcc Compiler Version )
VxWorks running on TI TNETV (MIPS) (gcc Compiler Version )
Linux running on Broadcom BCM (ARMv6) (gcc Compiler Version )
Linux running on TI TMSDM (ARMv4) (gcc Compiler Version )
Linux running on TI AMCBP (ARMv7) (gcc Compiler Version )
Oracle Solaris 10 (32 bit) running on SPARC-T3 (SPARCv9) (gcc Compiler Version)
Oracle Solaris 10 (64 bit) running on SPARC-T3 (SPARCv9) (gcc Compiler Version )
Oracle Solaris 11 (32 bit) running on Intel Xeon (gcc Compiler Version )
Oracle Solaris 11 (64 bit) running on Intel Xeon (gcc Compiler Version )
Oracle Solaris 11 running on Intel Xeon with AESNI (32 bit) (gcc Compiler Version )
Oracle Solaris 11 running on Intel Xeon with AESNI (64 bit) (gcc Compiler Version )
Oracle Linux 5 (64 bit) running on Intel Xeon (gcc Compiler Version )
CascadeOS (32 bit) running on Intel Pentium T (gcc Compiler Version )
CascadeOS (64 bit) running on Intel Pentium T (gcc Compiler Version )
Oracle Linux 5 running on Intel Xeon with PAA (gcc Compiler Version )
Oracle Linux 6 running on Intel Xeon without PAA (gcc Compiler Version )
Oracle Linux 6 running on Intel Xeon with PAA (gcc Compiler Version )
Oracle Solaris 11 (32 bit) running on SPARC-T3 (SPARCv9) (Sun C Version )
Oracle Solaris 11 (64 bit) running on SPARC-T3 (SPARCv9) (Sun C Version )
Android running on NVIDIA Tegra T20 (ARMv7) (gcc Compiler Version )
Apple iOS running on ARMv7 (gcc Compiler Version )
Microsoft Windows CE running on ARMv5TEJ (Microsoft C/C++ Optimizing Compiler Version for ARM)
Microsoft Windows CE running on ARMv7 (Microsoft C/C++ Optimizing Compiler Version for ARM)
Linux running on Freescale PowerPCe (gcc Compiler Version )
DSP Media Framework running on TI C64x+ (TMSC6x C/C++ Compiler v)
Android running on TI OMAP 3 (ARMv7) with NEON (gcc Compiler Version )
NetBSD running on PowerPCe (gcc Compiler Version )
NetBSD running on Intel Xeon (gcc Compiler Version )
Microsoft Windows 7 running on Intel Core i5- M (bit) with PAA (Microsoft ® C/C++ Optimizing Compiler Version for x64)
Android running on TI DM (ARMv7) without NEON (gcc Compiler Version )
Android running on TI DM (ARMv7) with NEON (gcc Complier Version )
Android running on Nvidia Tegra 3 (ARMv7) without NEON (gcc Compiler Version )
Android running on Nvidia Tegra 3 (ARMv7) with NEON (gcc Compiler Version )
Windows Embedded Compact 7 running on Freescale healthplum.us53xA (ARMv7) with NEON (Microsoft C/C++ Optimizing Compiler Version )
Windows Embedded Compact 7 running on Freescale healthplum.us53xD (ARMv7) with NEON (Microsoft C/C++ Optimizing Compiler Version )
Android running on Qualcomm Snapdragon APQ (ARMv7) with NEON (gcc compiler Version )
Apple OS X running on Intel Core iQM (Apple LLVM version )
Apple iOS running on ARM Cortex A8 (ARMv7) with NEON (gcc Compiler Version )
OpenWRT running on MIPS 24Kc (gcc Compiler Version )
QNX running on Freescale healthplum.us25 (ARMv4) (gcc Compiler Version )
Apple iOS running on Apple A6X SoC (ARMv7s) (gcc Compiler Version )
eCos 3 running on Freescale healthplum.us27 ejs (ARMv5TEJ) (gcc Compiler Version )
Vmware Horizon Workspace under Vmware ESXi running on Intel Xeon E (x86) without PAA (gcc Compiler Version )
Vmware Horizon Kaspersky Safe Kids 2020 License key Crack under Vmware ESXi running on Intel Xeon E (x86) with PAA (gcc Compiler Version )1
Ubuntu running on AMx Cortex-A8 (ARMv7) without NEON (gcc Compiler Version )
Ubuntu running on AMx Cortex-A8 (ARMv7) with NEON (gcc Compiler Version )
Linux running on ARM (ARMv5TEJ) (gcc Compiler Version )
Linux under Citrix XenServer running on Intel Xeon EL without PAA (gcc Compiler Version )
Linux under Citrix XenServer running on Intel Xeon EL with PAA (gcc Compiler Version )
Linux under Vmware ESXi running on Intel Xeon EL without PAA (gcc Compiler Version )
Linux under Vmware ESXi running on Intel Xeon EL with PAA (gcc Compiler Version )
Linux under Microsoft Windows Hyper-V running on Intel Xeon EL without PAA (gcc Compiler Version )
Linux under Microsoft Windows Hyper-V running on Intel Xeon EL with PAA (gcc Compiler Version )2
iOS running on Apple A5 / ARM Cortex-A9 (ARMv7) without NEON (gcc Compiler Version )
iOS running on Apple A5 / ARM Clean master vip apk download - Crack Key For U (ARMv7) with NEON (gcc Compiler Version )
PexOS under vSphere ESXi running on Intel Xeon EL without PAA (gcc Compiler Version )
PexOS under vSphere ESXi running on Intel Xeon EL with PAA (gcc Compiler Version )3
Linux running on Freescale ev2 (PPC) (gcc Compiler Version )
AcanOS running on Intel Core iQE (x86) without PAA (gcc Compiler Version )
AcanOS running on Intel Core iQE (x86) with PAA (gcc Compiler Version )
AcanOS running on Feroceon 88FR (ARMv5) (gcc Compiler Version )
FreeBSD running on Intel Xeon E (x86) without AESNI (gcc Compiler Version )
FreeBSD running on Xeon EL (x86) without AESNI (gcc Compiler Version )
FreeBSD running on Xeon EL Ace Utilities 6.5.0 Build 298 Key + Keygen Key Free Download 2021 with PAA (gcc Compiler Version )
ArbOS running on Xeon E (x86) without PAA (gcc Compiler Version )
Linux ORACLESP running on ASPEED AST-Series (ARMv5) (gcc Compiler Version )
Linux ORACLESP running on Emulex PILOT3 (ARMv5) (gcc Compiler Version )
ArbOS running on Xeon E (x86) with PAA (gcc Compiler Version )
FreeBSD running on Xeon EL (x86) without PAA (gcc Compiler Version )
FreeBSD running on Xeon EL (x86) with PAA (gcc Compiler Version )
FreeBSD running on Xeon EL (x86) without PAA (clang Compiler Version )
FreeBSD running on Xeon E5- L (x86) with PAA (clang Compiler Version )
FreeBSD running on Intel Xeon E (x86) bit (gcc Compiler Version )
Vmware Horizon Workspace under vSphere ESXi running on Intel Xeon E (x86) without PAA (gcc Compiler Version )
Vmware Horizon Workspace under vSphere ESXi running on Intel Xeon E (x86) with PAA (gcc Compiler Version )
QNX running on Freescale healthplum.us25 (ARMv4) (gcc Compiler Version )
Apple iOS bit running on Apple A7 (ARMv8) without NEON (clang Compiler Version )
Apple iOS bit running on Apple A7 (ARMv8) with NEON (clang Compiler Version )
Microsoft Windows Server R2 running on an Intel Xeon E (x64) (Microsoft bit C/C++ Bitdefender Total Security 2021. 25.0.26.89 Crack + Activation Key Free Compiler Version for 80x86) (single-user mode)

-FIPS Approved algorithms: AES (Certs. #, #, #, #, #, #, #, #, # and #); CVL (Certs. #10, #12, #24, #36, #49, #53, #71, #85, #, #, # and #); DRBG (Certs. #, #, #, #, #, #, #, #, # and #); DSA (Certs. #, #, #, #, #, #, #, #, # and #); ECDSA (Certs. #, #, #, #, #, #, #, #, #, #, # and #); HMAC (Certs. #, #, #, #, #, #, #, #, # and #); RSA (Certs. #, #, #, #, #, #, #, #, # and #); SHS (Certs. #, #, #, #, #, #, #, #, # and #); Triple-DES (Certs. #, #, #, #, #, #, #, #, # and #)

-Other algorithms: EC Diffie-Hellman; RNG; RSA (encrypt/decrypt)
Multi-chip standalone

"The LogRhythm FIPS Object Module is a general purpose cryptographic module. It is designed for ease of use with the popular OpenSSL cryptographic library and toolkit and is available for use without charge for a wide variety of platforms. The basic validation can also be extended quickly and affordably to accommodate new platforms and many types of modification."
Palo Alto Networks
Great America Pkwy
Santa Clara, CA
USA

Richard Bishop
TEL:

Jake Bajic
TEL:

CST Lab: NVLAP Panorama M
(Hardware Versions: P/Ns Version 00D, Version 00D, FIPS Kit P/N Version 00A; Firmware Version: )
(When operated in FIPS mode and with the tamper evident seals and opacity shields installed as indicated in the Security Policy)

Validated to FIPS
Consolidated Validation Certificate

Security Policy
Hardware09/30/
04/21/4/20/Overall Level: 2

-Cryptographic Module Specification: Level 3
-Design Assurance: Level 3
-Mitigation of Other Attacks: N/A

-FIPS Approved algorithms: AES (Cert. #); RSA (Cert. #); HMAC (Cert. #); SHS (Cert. #); DRBG (Cert. #); CVL (Cert. #)

-Other algorithms: Diffie-Hellman (key agreement; key establishment methodology provides bits of encryption strength); RSA (key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides bits of encryption strength); AES (key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides or bits of encryption strength); NDRNG; MD5; RC4; Camellia; RC2; SEED; DES
Multi-chip standalone

"Panorama on the M provides centralized management and visibilty of multiple Palo Alto Networks next-generation firewalls and supports distributed management and logging functions. It allows you to oversee all applications, users, and content traversing the network and then create application enablement policies that protect and control the entire network. Using Panorama for policy and device management increases operational effeciency in managing and maintaining distributed network of firewalls."
Hewlett Packard®, Enterprise
Taylor Street
Littleton, MA
USA

Theresa Conejero
TEL:
FAX: n/a

CST Lab: NVLAP Atalla Cryptographic Subsystem (ACS)
(Hardware Version: P/N AJA; Firmware Versions: Loader VersionPSMCU Version )

Validated to FIPS
Consolidated Validation Certificate

Security Policy
Hardware09/30/
01/25/1/24/Overall Level: 3

-Mitigation of Other Attacks: N/A

-FIPS Approved algorithms: AES (Cert. #); DRBG (Cert. #); RSA (Cert. #); SHS (Cert. #)

-Other algorithms: NDRNG
Multi-chip embedded

"The Atalla Cryptographic Subsystem (ACS) is a multi-chip embedded cryptographic module that provides secure cryptographic processing, key management, and storage capabilities."
Juniper Networks, Inc.
Innovation Way
Sunnyvale, CA
USA

Su-Chen Lin
TEL:

Seyed Safaish
TEL:

CST Lab: NVLAP Juniper Networks RE and RE Routing Engines Cryptographic Modules
(Hardware Versions: P/Ns RE-SX2-XXG, RE-SX4-XXG, RE-S-EXX4-XXG, RE-DUO-CG, RE-BXG, RE-AX2-XXG, RE-DUO-CG, ; Firmware Version: Junos R4 with Junos FIPS mode utilities R4)
(When operated in FIPS mode)

Validated to FIPS
Consolidated Validation Certificate

Security Policy
Hardware09/30/9/29/Overall Level: 1

-Cryptographic Module Specification: Level 3
-Roles, Services, and Authentication: Level 3
-Design Assurance: Level 3
-Mitigation of Other Attacks: N/A

-FIPS Approved algorithms: Triple-DES (Certs. # and #); AES (Cert. Ace Utilities 6.5.0 Build 298 Key + Keygen Key Free Download 2021 SHS (Certs. #, # and #); HMAC (Certs. # and #); ECDSA (Cert. #); RSA (Cert. #); CVL (Cert. #); DRBG (Cert. #)

-Other algorithms: Diffie-Hellman (key agreement; key establishment methodology provides between and bits of strength); EC Diffie-Hellman (key agreement; key establishment methodology provides between and bits of strength); HMAC-SHA (HMAC Certs. # and #); NDRNG
Multi-chip embedded

"The Juniper Networks RE and RE Routing Engines, are multi-chip embedded cryptographic modules that control a router or switch's trojan killer serial key - Crack Key For U, system management, and user access to the device. The RE runs Junos R4 with the FIPS mode package. The RE is compatible with the Juniper Networks MX Series 3D Universal Edge Routers, EX Series Switches, T Series Routers, M Series Multiservice Edge Routers, and PTX Series Packet Transport Routers. These devices provide dedicated high-performance flow processing and integrate advanced security capabilities."
Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.
, Samsung 1-ro
Hwaseong-si, Gyeonggi-do
Korea

Jisoo Kim
TEL:
FAX: (+)

CST Lab: NVLAP Samsung SAS 12G TCG Enterprise SSC SEDs PMx Series
(Hardware Versions: MZILSHCHPH9 [1, 2], MZILSHCHPH9 [1, 2], MZILS1T9HCHPH9 [1, 2], MZILS3T8HCJMH9 [1, 2], MZILSHCGRC6 [3], MZILSHCHPC6 [3], MZILS1T6HCHPC6 [3] and MZILS3T2HCJMC6 [3]; Firmware Versions: 3P00 [1], 3P02 [2] and EXP2 [3])

Validated to FIPS
Consolidated Validation Certificate

Security Policy
Hardware09/23/
03/21/3/20/Overall Level: 2

-EMI/EMC: Level 3
-Mitigation of Other Attacks: N/A

-FIPS Approved algorithms: AES (Cert. #); ECDSA (Cert. #); SHS (Cert. #); DRBG (Cert. #)

-Other algorithms: NDRNG
Multi-chip standalone
Cobham TCS Limited
The Cobham Centre - Solent Fusion 2
Parkway Solent Business Park
Whiteley, Hampshire PO15 7AB
United Kingdom

Graham Foord
TEL: +44 (0)
FAX: +44 (0)

Neil McSparron
TEL: +44 (0)
FAX: +44 (0)

CST Lab: NVLAP Cobham AES Cryptographic Firmware-Hybrid Module
(Hardware Version: Freescale ColdFire MCF; Firmware Version: )
(When operated in FIPS mode)

Validated to FIPS
Consolidated Validation Certificate

Security Policy
Firmware-Hybrid09/23/9/22/Overall Level: 1

-Mitigation of Other Attacks: N/A
-Tested: Cobham DD TX with FreeRTOS Operating System version

-FIPS Approved algorithms: AES (Cert. #); SHS (Cert. #); HMAC (Cert. #)

-Other algorithms: DES; CRC32
Multi-chip standalone

"The Cobham AES Cryptographic Firmware-Hybrid Module is used in Cobham’s products to provide secure AES Encryption such as in the NETNode IP Mesh radio to protect data transmitted over the NETNode high capacity ad-hoc multi-radio mesh network."
Vectra Networks
South Winchester Blvd,
Suite
Bin
San Jose, CA
USA

Jason Kehl

CST Lab: NVLAP Vectra Networks Cryptographic Module
(Software Version: )
(When operated in FIPS mode. The module generates cryptographic keys whose strengths are modified by available entropy.)

Validated to FIPS
Consolidated Validation Certificate

Security Policy

Vendor Product Link
Software09/17/
02/10/2/9/Overall Level: 1

-Physical Security: N/A
-Mitigation of Other Attacks: N/A
-Tested Configuration(s): Tested as meeting Level 1 with Tested as meeting Level 1 with SUSE Linux Enterprise 11 SP2 on a Dell OptiPlex
CentOS on a Dell OptiPlex
Red Hat Enterprise Linux on a Dell OptiPlex (single-user mode)

-FIPS Approved algorithms: AES (Cert. #); CVL (Cert. #44); DRBG (Cert. #); DSA (Cert. #); ECDSA (Cert. #); HMAC (Cert. #); RSA (Cert. #); SHS (Cert. #); Triple-DES (Cert. #)

-Other algorithms: RSA (key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides between and bits of encryption strength; non-compliant less than bits of encryption strength); EC Diffie-Hellman (key agreement; key establishment methodology provides Ace Utilities 6.5.0 Build 298 Key + Keygen Key Free Download 2021 and bits of encryption strength; non-compliant less than bits of encryption strength); RNG
Multi-chip standalone

"The Vectra Networks Cryptographic Module provides cryptographic functions for the Vectra X-Series platforms software, which delivers a new class of advanced persistent threat (APT) defense Windows 7 Enterprise Product key Generator real-time detection and analysis of active network breaches."
Red Hat®, Inc.
East Davie Street
Raleigh, NC
USA

Steve Grubb
TEL:
FAX:

Jaroslav Reznik
TEL: +
FAX: +

CST Lab: NVLAP Red Hat Enterprise Linux OpenSSH Client Cryptographic Module
(Software Version: )
(When operated in FIPS mode with module Red Hat Enterprise Linux OpenSSL Module validated to FIPS under Cert. # operating in FIPS mode. The module generates cryptographic keys whose strengths are modified by available entropy)

Validated to FIPS
Consolidated Validation Certificate

Security Policy

Vendor Product Link
Software09/16/
04/28/4/27/Overall Level: 1

-Physical Security: N/A
-Tested Configuration(s): Tested as meeting Level 1 with Red Hat Enterprise Linux running on HP ProLiant DLp Gen8 with PAA
Red Hat Enterprise Linux running on HP ProLiant DLp Gen8 without PAA
Red Hat Enterprise Linux running on IBM System x M4 with PAA
Red Hat Ace Utilities 6.5.0 Build 298 Key + Keygen Key Free Download 2021 Linux running on IBM System x M4 without PAA (single-user mode)

-FIPS Approved algorithms: CVL (Certs. # and #)

-Other algorithms: N/A
Multi-chip standalone

"The OpenSSH Client cryptographic module provides the client-side component for an SSH protocol version 2 protected communication channel. OpenSSH is the standard SSH implementation and shipped with RHEL Its cryptographic mechanisms use the OpenSSL library in FIPS mode."
Red Hat®, Inc.
East Davie Street
Raleigh, NC
USA

Steve Grubb
TEL:
FAX:

Jaroslav Reznik
TEL: +
FAX: +

CST Lab: NVLAP Red Hat Enterprise Linux OpenSSH Server Cryptographic Module
(Software Version: )
(When operated in FIPS mode with module Red Hat Enterprise Linux OpenSSL Module validated to FIPS under Cert. # operating in FIPS mode. The module generates cryptographic keys whose strengths are modified by available entropy)

Validated to FIPS
Consolidated Validation Certificate

Security Policy

Vendor Product Link
Software09/16/
04/28/4/27/Overall Level: 1

-Physical Security: N/A
-Tested Configuration(s): Tested as meeting Level 1 with Red Hat Enterprise Linux running on HP ProLiant DLp Gen8 with PAA
Red Hat Enterprise Ace Utilities 6.5.0 Build 298 Key + Keygen Key Free Download 2021 running on HP ProLiant DLp Gen8 without PAA
Red Hat Enterprise Linux running on IBM System x M4 with PAA
Red Hat Enterprise Linux running on IBM System x M4 without PAA (single-user mode)

-FIPS Approved algorithms: CVL (Certs. # and #)

-Other algorithms: N/A
Multi-chip standalone

"The OpenSSH Server cryptographic module provides the server-side component for an SSH protocol version 2 protected communication channel. OpenSSH UltraCompare Free Download the standard SSH implementation and shipped with RHEL Its cryptographic mechanisms use the OpenSSL library in FIPS mode."
Accellion, Inc.
Embarcadero Road
Suite
Palo Alto, CA
USA

Prateek Jain
TEL: +
FAX: +

CST Lab: NVLAP Accellion kiteworks Cryptographic Module
(Software Version: KWLIB_2_0_2)
(When operated in FIPS mode)

Validated to FIPS
Consolidated Validation Certificate

Security Policy
Software09/15/9/14/Overall Level: 1

-Physical Security: N/A
-Design Assurance: Level 2
-Mitigation of Other Attacks: N/A
-Tested Configuration(s): Tested as meeting Level 1 with CentOS on VMware ESXi running on a Dell Inc. PowerEdge R (single-user mode)

-FIPS Approved algorithms: AES (Cert. #); CVL (Certs. # and #); DRBG (Cert. #); ECDSA (Cert. #); HMAC (Certs. # and #); RSA (Cert. #); SHS (Certs. # and #); Triple-DES (Cert. #)

-Other algorithms: RSA (key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides or bits of encryption strength; non-compliant less than bits of encryption strength); NDRNG; AES (non-compliant); DRBG (non-compliant); DSA (non-compliant); ECDSA (non-compliant); HMAC (non-compliant); RNG (non-compliant); RSA (non-compliant); SHS (non-compliant); Triple-DES (non-compliant); Diffie-Hellman; adler32; Blowfish; CAMELLIA; CAST5; crc32; crc32b; DES; DESX; fnv; fnv; gost; haval; IDEA; joaat; MDC2; MD2; MD4; MD5; RC2; RC4; RC4-HMAC-MD5; RIPEMD; SEED; snefru; snefru; SSLeay; Tiger; Whirlpool; rand(); mtrand()
Multi-chip standalone

"Accellion kiteworks Cryptographic Module is a key component of Accellion's kiteworks product that enables enterprises to securely share and transfer files. Extensive tracking and reporting tools allow compliance with SOX, HIPAA, FDA and GLB regulations while providing enterprise grade security and ease Security Software use."
Lexmark International, Inc.
W. New Circle Road
Lexington, KY
USA

Sean Gibbons
TEL:

CST Lab: NVLAP Lexmark™ Crypto Module
(Firmware Version: )
(No assurance of the minimum strength of generated keys)

Validated to FIPS
Consolidated Validation Certificate

Security Policy
Firmware09/14/9/13/Overall Level: 1

-Mitigation of Other Attacks: N/A
-Tested: Lexmark MXde with Lexmark(TM) Linux version

-FIPS Approved algorithms: SHS (Certs. # and #); HMAC (Certs. # and #); AES (Cert. #)

-Other algorithms: N/A
Multi-chip standalone

"The Lexmark™ Crypto Module is a firmware option for Lexmark™ and Dell® Multi-Function Printers that permit the transfer, storage and printing of encrypted print jobs. Using the Lexmark™ Crypto Module, a printer is capable of encrypting and decrypting data input to and output from the module crypto kernel using the AES (FIPS ) encryption algorithm."
Pitney Bowes, Inc.
37 Executive Drive
Danbury, CT
USA

Dave Riley
TEL:
FAX:

CST Lab: NVLAP Pitney Bowes MS1 X4 Postal Security Device (PSD)
(Hardware Version: Part # 4W Rev AAA; MAX Secure Microcontroller Revision B4; Firmware Version: Device Abstraction Layer (DAL) Version F4; PB Bootloader Version ; PSD Application Version E)
(When operated in FIPS Mode.)

Validated to FIPS
Consolidated Validation Certificate

Security Policy
Hardware09/09/9/8/Overall Level: 3

-Mitigation of Other Attacks: N/A

-FIPS Approved algorithms: DSA (Cert. #); ECDSA (Cert. #); CVL (Cert. #); SHS (Cert. #); AES (Certs. #); DRBG (Cert. #); HMAC (Cert. #); KAS (Cert. #49); Triple-DES (Cert. #); RSA (Cert. #); KTS (AES Cert. #); Triple-DES MAC (Triple-DES Cert. #, Vendor affirmed)

-Other algorithms: Diffie-Hellman (key agreement; key establishment methodology provides bits of encryption strength; non-compliant less than bits of encryption strength); TRNG
Single-chip

"The MS1 X4 PSD is a single chip cryptographic module using the Maxim MAX hardware that provides security services to support the creation of digital postage evidence in the form of an indicium."
Kanguru Solutions
Main Street
Millis, MA
USA

Nate Cote
TEL:
FAX:

CST Lab: NVLAP Kanguru Defender Elite
(Hardware Versions: P/Ns KDFEG-Green [1, 2], KDFEG-Black [1, 2], KDFEG-Red [1, 2], KDFEG-Silver [1, 2], KDFEG-Green [1, 2], KDFEG-Black [1, 2], KDFEG-Red [1, 2], KDFEG-Silver [1, 2], KDFEG-Green [1, 2], KDFEG-Black [1, 2], KDFEG-Red [1, 2], KDFEG-Silver [1, 2], KDFEG-Green [1, 2], KDFEG-Black [1, 2], KDFEG-Red [1, 2], KDFEG-Silver [1, 2], KDFEG-Green [1, 2], KDFEG-Black [1, 2], KDFEG-Red [1, 2], KDFEG-Silver [1, 2], KDFEG-Green [1, 2], KDFEG-Black [1, 2], KDFEG-Red [1, 2], KDFEG-Silver [1, 2], KDFEG-PRO-Green [2], KDFEG-PRO-Black [2], KDFEG-PRO-Red [2], KDFEG-PRO-Silver [2], Version ; Firmware Ace Utilities 6.5.0 Build 298 Key + Keygen Key Free Download 2021 [1] and [2])

Validated to FIPS
Consolidated Validation Certificate

Security Policy

Vendor Product Link
Hardware09/09/
06/21/6/20/Overall Level: 2

-Cryptographic Module Specification: Level 3
-Roles, Services, and Authentication: Level 3
-EMI/EMC: Level 3
-Design Assurance: Level 3
-Mitigation of Other Attacks: N/A

-FIPS Approved algorithms: HMAC (Cert. #); AES (Cert. #); SHS (Cert. #); RSA (Cert. #); DRBG (Cert. #); PBKDF (vendor affirmed)

-Other algorithms: NDRNG; RSA (key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides bits of encryption strength)
Multi-chip standalone

"The Kanguru Defender Elite Cryptographic Module is a bit AES hardware encrypted USB flash drive. It is used to securely store sensitive data housed on the device."
Red Hat®, Inc.
East Davie Street
Raleigh, NC
USA

Ann Marie Rubin
TEL:
FAX:

Steve Grubb
TEL:
FAX:

CST Lab: NVLAP Red Hat Enterprise Linux OpenSSL Module, Red Hat Enterprise Linux OpenSSL Module
(Software Versions:)
(When operated in FIPS mode. The module generates cryptographic keys whose strengths are modified by available entropy)

Validated to FIPS
Consolidated Validation Certificate

Security Policy

Vendor Product Link
Software09/08/
01/27/
02/16/
12/21/12/20/Overall Level: 1

-Physical Security: N/A
-Tested Configuration(s): Red Hat Enterprise Linux running on HP ProLiant DLp Gen8 with PAA
Red Hat Enterprise Linux running on HP ProLiant DLp Gen8 without PAA
Red Hat Enterprise Linux running on IBM System x M4 with PAA
Red Hat Enterprise Linux running on IBM System x M4 without PAA
Red Hat Enterprise Linux running on HP ProLiant DL Gen8 with PAA
Red Hat Enterprise Linux running on HP ProLiant DL Gen8 without PAA
Red Hat Enterprise Linux running on IBM POWER8 Little Endian A
Red Hat Enterprise Linux running on IBM z13 with CP Assist for Cryptographic Functions (single-user mode)

-FIPS Approved algorithms: AES (Certs. #, #, #, #, #, #, #, #, #, #, #, #, #, #, #, #, #, #, #, #, #, # and #); Triple-DES (Certs. #, #, #, #, #, #, #, # and #); RSA (Certs. #, #, #, #, #, #, #, #, # and #); DSA (Certs. #, #, #, #, #, #, #, #, # and #); ECDSA (Certs. #, #, #, #, #, #, #, # and #); DRBG (Certs. #, #, #, #, #, #, #, #, #, #, #, #, #, #, #, #, #, #, #, #, #, #, #, #, #, #, #, #, #, #, #, #, #, #, #, # and #); SHS Ace Utilities 6.5.0 Build 298 Key + Keygen Key Free Download 2021. #, #, #, #, #, #, #, #, #, #, #, #, #, #, #, #, #, #, #, #, #, #, # and #); HMAC (Certs. #, #, #, #, #, #, #, #, #, #, #, #, #, #, #, #, #, #, #, #, #, # and #); CVL (Certs. #, #, #, #, #, #, #, #, #, #, #, # and #)

-Other algorithms: RSA (key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides or bits of encryption strength; non-compliant less than bits of encryption strength); Diffie-Hellman (CVL Certs. #, # and #, key agreement; key establishment methodology provides or bits of encryption strength; non-compliant less than bits of encryption strength); EC Diffie-Hellman (CVL Certs. #, # and #, key agreement; key establishment methodology provides between and bits of encryption strength); MD5; RNG; Camellia; CAST; DES; IDEA; J-PAKE; MD2; MD4; MDC2; RC2; RC4; RC5; RIPEMD; Whirlpool
Multi-chip standalone

"The OpenSSL FIPS Runtime Module is a general purpose cryptographic library designed to provide FIPS validated cryptographic functionality for use with the high level API of theOpenSSL library."
Oracle Corporation
Oracle Parkway
Redwood Shores, CA
USA

Joshua Brickman
TEL:
FAX:

Tyrone Magoshare Data Recovery 4.1 License Code Crack Free +
FAX: +

CST Lab: NVLAP Java Card Platform for Infineon on SLE 78 (SLJ 52GxxyyyzR)
(Hardware Version: M B11; Firmware Version: f)

Validated to FIPS
Consolidated Validation Certificate

Security Policy
Hardware09/03/9/2/Overall KMSAuto Net download for windows 10 3

-FIPS Approved algorithms: AES (Cert. #); Triple-DES (Cert. #); Triple-DES MAC (Triple DES Cert. #; vendor affirmed); DSA (Cert. #); RSA (Cert. #); ECDSA (Cert. #); SHS (Cert. #); DRBG (Cert. #)

-Other algorithms: EC Diffie-Hellman (key agreement; key establishment methodology provides between and bits of encryption strength)
Single-chip

"The cryptographic module consists of MB11 security controller by Infineon Technologies together with embedded software providing a secure execution environment consisting of a Java Card Runtime, Java Card Virtual Machine, Java Card API and Global Platform Card Manager along with native cryptographic library calls made available to applets through Java Card APIs. It is compliant with Java Card specifications version Classic Edition and the Global Platform card specification version In particular, it implements the GlobalPlatform ID Configuration "
Alcatel-Lucent
March Road
Ottawa, ON K2K 2E6
Canada

Naren V. Patel
TEL:

CST Lab: NVLAP Alcatel-Lucent Photonic Service Switch (PSS)
(Hardware Versions: WOCUATAUAB / 3KCAA 02 [1], WOM3P00CRC / 8DGAA 03 [2], WOMNW00ERB / 8DGAA 02 [3], EC PSS-4 (3KCABAC) [1], E4PFDCAK [1], 11QPEN4 [], 10G MR XFP [], 10GBASE-SR XFP [], 1AB [], X8FCLC-L [], X8FCSN-I [], XLTU XFP [], EC PSS/PSS (8DGAD) [2,3], PF (V DC) PSS, 20A [2], 8DGAA [], PF (V DC) PSS, 20A [3], 8DGGAAA-TSZZA [3], with FIPS Kits 3KCAAAA [1], 3KCAAAA [1], 8DGAAAA [2] and 8DGAAAA [3]; Firmware Version: )
(When operated in FIPS mode with the tamper evident seals installed as indicated in the Security Policy and configured according to Section of the Security Policy)

Validated to FIPS
Consolidated Validation Certificate

Security Policy
Hardware09/03/9/2/Overall Level: 2

-Roles, Services, and Authentication: Level 3
-Mitigation of Other Attacks: N/A

-FIPS Approved algorithms: AES (Certs. #, # and #); CVL (Certs. # and #); SHS (Certs. # and #)

-Other algorithms: MD5; AES (Certs. # and #, key wrapping)
Multi-chip standalone

"The PSS is a scalable, next-generation Dense Wave Division Multipexer (DWDM) platform that supports data center aggregation for Ethernet, Fiber Channel (FC) and other protocols. Multiprotocol services can then be dynamically and flexibly transported over metro and long-haul spans, using Tunable and Reconfigurable Optical Add-Drop Multiplexers (T-ROADMs) for optical wavelengths. The PSS enables transparent L2 Ethernet or FC and L3 IP services over the optical link."
SUSE, LLC
10 Canal Park, Suite
Cambridge, Massachusetts
USA

Thomas Biege
TEL: +49

Michael Hager
TEL: +49 80

CST Lab: NVLAP SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 12 - OpenSSL Module
(Software Version: )
(When operated in FIPS mode. The module generates cryptographic keys whose strengths are modified by available entropy)

Validated to FIPS
Consolidated Validation Certificate

Security Policy

Vendor Product Link
Software08/20/8/19/Overall Level: 1

-Physical Security: N/A
-Tested Configuration(s): Tested as meeting Level 1 with SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 12 running on HP ProLiant DLe Gen8 with PAA
SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 12 running on HP ProLiant DLe Gen8 without PAA (single-user mode)

-FIPS Approved algorithms: AES (Certs. #, # and #); Triple-DES (Cert. #); DSA (Cert. #); RSA (Cert. #); ECDSA (Cert. #); SHS (Certs. #, # and #); HMAC (Certs. #, # and #); DRBG (Certs. #, # and #); CVL (Certs. # and #)

-Other algorithms: Diffie-Hellman (CVL Cert. #, key agreement; key establishment methodology provides or bits of encryption strength; non-compliant less than bits of encryption strength); EC Diffie-Hellman (CVL Cert. #, key agreement; key establishment methodology provides between and bits of encryption strength; non-compliant less than bits of encryption strength); RSA (key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides or bits of encryption strength; non-compliant less than bits of encryption strength); ANSI X RNG (non-compliant); MD2; MD4; MD5; MDC-2; HMAC-MD5; Blowfish; Camellia; CAST; DES; IDEA; JPAKE; RC2; RC4; RC5; RIPEMD; SEED; TLS-SRP; Whirlpool
Multi-chip standalone

"OpenSSL is an open-source library of various cryptographic algorithms written mainly in C."
SafeNet, Inc.
20 Colonnade Road, Suite
Ottawa, ON K2E 7M6
Canada

Security and Certifications Team

CST Lab: NVLAP ProtectServer Internal Express 2 (PSI-E2)
(Hardware Versions: VBD, Version Code ; Firmware Version: )
(When operated in FIPS mode and installed, initialized and configured as specified in the Security Policy Section 3)

Validated to FIPS
Consolidated Validation Certificate

Security Policy

Vendor Product Link
Hardware08/20/
11/24/
01/10/
06/23/
06/23/1/9/Overall Level: 3

-Mitigation of Other Attacks: N/A

-FIPS Approved algorithms: AES (Certs. #, # and #); DRBG (Cert. #); DSA (Cert. #); ECDSA (Cert. #); HMAC (Cert. #); KAS (Cert. #51); RSA (Cert. #); SHS (Cert. #); Triple-DES (Certs. # and #); Triple-DES MAC (Triple-DES Cert. #, vendor affirmed)

-Other algorithms: AES (Cert. #, key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides between and bits of encryption strength); Triple-DES (Cert. #, key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides bits of encryption strength); RSA (key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides between and bits of encryption strength); Diffie-Hellman (key agreement; key establishment methodology provides between and bits of encryption strength); EC Diffie-Hellman (key agreement; key establishment methodology provides or bits of encryption strength); NDRNG
Multi-chip embedded

"The SafeNet PSI-E 2 is a high-end intelligent PCI adapter card, used either standalone or in the SafeNet PSE 2 appliance, that provides a wide range of cryptographic functions using firmware and dedicated hardware processors. The module provides key management (e.g., generation, storage, deletion, and backup), an extensive suite of cryptographic mechanisms, and process management including separation between operators. The PSI-E 2 also features non-volatile tamper protected memory for key storage, a hardware random number generator, and an RTC."
Forcepoint
Sorrento Valley Road
San Diego, CA
USA

Matt Sturm
TEL:

Paul Lee
TEL:

CST Lab: NVLAP Websense Java Crypto Module
(Software Version: )
(When operated in FIPS mode. The module generates cryptographic keys whose strengths are modified by available entropy. No assurance of the minimum strength of generated keys)

Validated to FIPS
Consolidated Validation Certificate

Security Policy
Software08/19/
04/11/4/10/Overall Level: 1

-Physical Security: N/A
-Mitigation of Other Attacks: N/A
-Tested Configuration(s): Tested as meeting Level 1 with Windows Server with Java Runtime Environment (JRE) v_17 running on OEM PowerEdge R (single-user mode)

-FIPS Approved algorithms: AES (Cert. #); DSA (Cert. #); ECDSA (Cert. #); RSA (Cert. #); HMAC (Cert. #); SHS (Cert. #); DRBG (Cert. #); Triple-DES (Cert. #)

-Other algorithms: Diffie-Hellman (key agreement; key establishment methodology provides between and bits of encryption strength; non-compliant less than bits of encryption strength); EC Diffie-Hellman (key agreement; key establishment methodology provides between and bits of encryption strength; non-compliant less than bits of encryption strength); AES (non-compliant); RNG (non-compliant); Blowfish; Camellia; CAST5; CAST6; ChaCha; DES; Triple-DES (non-compliant); ElGamal; GOST; GOST; Grain; Grainv1; HC; HC; IDEA; IES; ISAAC; MD2; MD4; MD5; Naccache Stern; Noekeon; Password-Based-Encryption (PBE); RC2; RC2 Key Wrapping; RC4; RC; RC; RC6; RFC Wrapping; RFC Wrapping; Rijndael; Ripe MD; Ripe MD; Ripe MD; Ripe MD; RSA Encryption; Salsa 20; SEED; SEED Wrapping; Serpent; Shacal2; SHA-3 (non-compliant); SHA/t (non-compliant); Skein*; Skein*; Skein*; Skipjack; DRBG (non-compliant); TEA; Threefish; Tiger; TLS v KDF (non-compliant); Twofish; VMPC; Whirlpool; XSalsa20; XTEAEngine
Multi-chip standalone

"The Websense Java Crypto Module provides cryptographic functions for a variety of security solutions from Forcepoint."
VASCO Data Security International, Inc.
Koningin Astridlaan
Wemmel
Belgium

Frederik Mennes
TEL: +32 2 97 00
FAX: +32 2 97 09

CST Lab: NVLAP DIGIPASS GO-7
(Hardware Version: DIGIPASS GO-7 FIPS ; Firmware Version: )

Validated to FIPS
Consolidated Validation Certificate

Security Policy
Hardware08/19/8/18/Overall Level: 2

-EMI/EMC: Level 3
-Design Assurance: Level 3
-Mitigation of Other Attacks: N/A

-FIPS Approved algorithms: AES (Certs. # and #); KBKDF (Cert. #44)

-Other algorithms: N/A
Multi-chip standalone

"DIGIPASS GO-7 is a 'one-button' strong authentication hardware device, based on VASCO's proven DIGIPASS technology. With a single press of a button, DIGIPASS GO-7 generates and displays a dynamic one-time password every time the user wants to log onto an application, website or network."
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